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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines reforms to criminal sentencing procedures in 
Canada, focusing on Aboriginal healing circles, which were incorporated as 
“sentencing circles” into the criminal trial. Using the lens of comparative law 
and legal transplants, this Article recounts the period of sentencing reform in 
Canada in the 1990s, when scholars, practitioners, and activists inquired into 
Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal justice system by comparing Euro-
Canadian and Aboriginal justice values and principles. As a way to bridge the 
gap between vastly differing worldviews and approaches to justice, judges and 
Aboriginal justice advocates transplanted sentencing circles into the 
sentencing phase of the criminal trial. This Article presents original data 
compiled from a review of all published decisions in Canada that mention the 
term sentencing circle. It reviews judicial treatment of requests for sentencing 
circles, and tracks sentencing decisions once a circle was held. Additionally, 
this Article uses sentencing circles as a point of entry into conversations about 
legal instrumentalism in law reform and legal transplants. It argues that the 
progress of these reforms points to larger questions about culture and what it 
currently means to use law as a tool for social change.  
∗ Toby S. Goldbach is an Adjunct Professor of Law and Postdoctoral Associate in the Graduate 
Legal Studies Program at Cornell University Law School. It is with heartfelt gratitude that I 
thank Aziz Rana, Valerie Hans, Annelise Riles, and Mitchel Lasser for their guidance in 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s legal environment is one of creation, adaptation, and change.1 
Whether in the pursuit of economic development,2 democratization,3 or 
1 See John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline 
and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 457 (1977); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184, 205 (1996) (“Once nations 
begin to interact, a complex process occurs, whereby international legal norms seep into, are 
internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal and political processes.”); Terence C. 
Halliday, Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the Reconstruction of 
States in East Asia, 37(2) L. & SOC. INQUIRY 265, 266 (2012); Gregory Shaffer, Transnational 
Legal Process and State Change, 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 229 (2012); Terence C. Halliday, 
Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 263 (2009). 
But see Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The “Americanization” of European 
Law?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 99, 100 (2007) (challenging the suggestion that law in Western 
Europe is converging “with the American ‘way of law,’ particularly at the level of European 
nation-states, whose domestic legal systems and institutions still bulk large in the lives of 
individuals, business firms, and other organizations.”). 
2 See, e.g., Ronald J. Daniels et al., The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and 
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (2011) (reviewing 
the literature on the relationship between legal transplants and economic development); Rafael 
La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 302, 
324–25 (2008) (describing the reasons for legal transplants and examining the economic effects of 
legal origins, in particular the effect of common law legal systems on per capita income, investor 
protection, and financial development); see generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. 
DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS 
1–12 (2008). 
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political or social harmonization,4 identifying best practices5 and 
transporting them elsewhere has become common-fare. Scholars who focus on 
“legal transplants”6 tend to address two main sets of questions: first, how 
3 See, e.g., Kim Seong-Hyun, The Democratization and Internationalization of the Korean Legal 
Field, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 217, 229–35 (Yves 
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011); Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury 
Systems as Deliberative Agents of Social Change: De-Colonial Strategies and Deliberative 
Participatory Democracy, 86 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 789, 791 (2011) (arguing that the introduction of 
the quasi-jury and grand jury in Japan brought citizen oversight of the politically elite—who 
were formerly considered political “untouchables”); Zachary Corey & Valerie P. Hans, Japan’s 
New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in Action?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y  J. 72, 89 
(2010) (considering the potential of the new lay judge system in Japan to generate “legitimizing 
and civic engagement effects”). 
4 See, e.g., Mads Andenas et al., Towards a Theory of Harmonisation, in THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF HARMONISATION 572, 573 (Mads Andenas & Camilla Baasch Andersen eds., 2011) 
(“Harmonisation has been an important feature of modern legal systems . . . . For example, 
harmonization has been a core instrument of the European Union and Council of Europe, whilst 
at the international global level, there has been a long and established tradition of 
harmonisation of commercial law . . . .”); see generally John H. Merryman, On the Convergence 
(and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357 (1981) 
(outlining the political and cultural factors that both promote convergence of legal systems and 
provide a force for decentralization); but see Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code and Civil Law: 
The “Europeanization” of Private Law Within the European Community and the Re-Emergence of 
a European Legal Science, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 73, 77–78 (1994) (discussing the 
implementation of directives—which allow national governments to choose the form and method 
of compliance—as a mechanism for harmonization and detailing the negative consequences of 
using directives, such as increased fragmentation as a result of having two sets of rules, or legal 
ossification as a result of the difficult process in generating initial agreement on the directive).   
5 David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE 
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 155 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (discussing development professionals’ turn away from economic 
analysis after the currency crisis of the 1990s to the identification of “best practices” in economic 
development and performance); Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on 
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 97 (2002) (discussing the expectation that adopting 
“best practices” and incorporating legal standards into conventions and treaties will have the 
“double benefit of reducing transaction costs for transnational investors and increasing the 
quality of legal institutions” in developing countries); see also Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, 
Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1989) (discussing the approach of 
“better solution” comparative law scholars, who advocate for objective evaluation of the various 
solutions provided by the world’s legal systems, and challenging the premise that there can be 
objectivity in identifying best practices). 
6 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 7, 19 (2d ed. 
1993) (arguing that comparative law is predominantly the study of a history of legal exchanges 
between legal systems, which consists of borrowing and modifying legal rules, and thus 
comparative law methodology should focus on legal transplants—the “borrowing and 
transmissibility of rules from one society or system to another” for the purpose of legal 
development); Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant 
Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 174 (2003) (explaining the meaning of a legal transplant could be 
understood as follows: “[w]hen a transplant country applies a rule that it has transplanted from 
an origin, it is effectively applying a rule to its own local circumstances that was developed in a 
foreign socioeconomic order”); THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Mauro Bussani & 
Ugo Mattei eds., 2003); Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and 
Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 441–74 (Mathias Reimann & 
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legal rules or institutions travel,7 and second, how foreign laws interact with 
domestic legal systems.8 Scholars generally do not contest that transplanted 
legal institutions have the potential to solve socio-legal problems. 
Transplanting legal institutions is a matter “of usefulness and need. No one 
bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home . 
. . .”9  
Unfortunately, scholars have not examined institutions that are 
transplanted, not as a result of their usefulness, but rather because of their 
cultural and symbolic import.10 Are the problems raised by using legal 
transplants to represent cultural and humanistic goals different from other 
cases where there is a transplant effect?  
This Article discusses reforms to Canadian criminal sentencing 
procedures and the incorporation of Aboriginal methods into the criminal 
trial. In particular, this Article presents the transplanted “sentencing 
circle”11 as an example of how legal scholars’ and practitioners’ views 
regarding legal instrumentalism12 might be changing. This Article claims 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (citing three causes for the movement of law: power, prestige, 
and institutional change aimed at improving economic performance). 
7 See, e.g., Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, Some Reflections on the Transplantation of British 
Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 561 (2009) (examining 
company law transplants in Palestine in the early 20th Century and arguing that lawyers, legal 
academics, and colonial legislators influenced the exportation of English company law to 
countries in the British Empire); see also WATSON, supra note 6. 
8 See, e.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 174 (arguing that a legal transplant “increases its 
own receptivity [in the import country] by making a significant adaptation of the foreign formal 
legal order to initial conditions, in particular to the preexisting formal and informal legal order. 
Changes in the transplanted rules or legal institutions indicate that the appropriateness of these 
rules has been considered and modifications were made to take into account domestic legal 
practice or other initial conditions.”) (emphasis in the original); see generally Máximo Langer, 
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (2004) (examining the ways 
that local legal cultures in Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France interacted with the 
importation of American-style plea bargaining); Toby Goldbach et al., The Movement of U.S. 
Criminal and Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting and Translating, 20 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 141, 158–60, 164–67 (2013) (arguing that legal elites in Asia both imported 
and modified U.S. criminal procedures, such as plea bargaining and procedures for a jury trial 
for use in the criminal trial). 
9 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 17 (Tony Weir 
trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
10 See discussion infra Part IV. A. 
11 I refer to the traditional Aboriginal process and the process incorporated into the criminal trial 
by the following terms: “healing circle” and “sentencing circle” respectively. Some texts, 
government documents, and cases use these terms interchangeably. While there is no one form of 
healing circle that covers all traditional processes, I try to keep the terms separate, in the very 
least to place an emphasis on the process of transplantation.     
12 On the meaning of legal instrumentalism, see generally Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudence—the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 452 (1930) (“It seems patent that only a 
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that law reform goals have become more “expressive,”13 in that they include 
cultural and normative goals in addition to, or instead of, sociological goals. 
The effect is to “instrumentalize”14 culture and normativity.15 In 
gain in realism and effectiveness of thinking can come from consistently (not occasionally) 
regarding the official [legal] formulation as a tool, not as a thing of value in itself; as a means 
without meaning save in terms of its workings, and of meaning in its workings only when these 
last are compared with the results desired.”); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL 
L.Q. 17, 23, 26 (1924) (“As matter of actual fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation 
of a conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), and then we look around for principles and 
data which will substantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelligently between rival 
conclusions. No lawyer ever thought out the case of a client in terms of the syllogism. He begins 
with a conclusion which he intends to reach, favorable to his client of course, and then analyzes 
the facts of the situation to find material out of which to construct a favorable statement of facts, 
to form a minor premise.”); PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS 93 (1987) (“rules are conceived essentially as instruments—as means to sound 
goals . . . .”). On the place of legal instrumentalism in legal scholarship, see ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 31, 35, 60 (1982) (the most 
sustained and prominent belief about law in the last hundred years has been that law is a social 
instrument; social reality is malleable and can be altered “by humans for human purposes in the 
course of solving problems”); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE 
RULE OF LAW 118 (2006) (“Almost all of the major theoretical and empirical perspectives toward 
law that circulate today . . . characterize law in fundamentally instrumental terms.”); Mark 
Kelman, The Past and Future of Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 432, 433 (1983) (“The 
instinct of most law professors—again when discussing big concepts, like the nature of 
property—is unquestionably to be highly positivistic and instrumentalist”); Austin Sarat & 
Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 L. & POL’Y 97, 104 (1988) (“At the beginning of 
the 20th century, the modest reform efforts of legal realism advanced an instrumentalist concept 
of law. In this, legal realism reacted against then prevailing formalist conceptions of law and 
worked to adapt legal thought to . . . one in which the state came to assume a much more explicit 
role in steering society); see generally Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Studying How Law 
Matters: An Introduction, in HOW DOES LAW MATTER? (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 
1998); Richard L. Abel, Law and Society: Project and Practice, 6 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 1 
(2010); Daphna Hacker, Law and Society Jurisprudence, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 727, 742 (2011) 
(examining the place of legal instrumentalist thought and the “preoccupation” with “legal 
reforms aimed at achieving social goals” in the Law and Society movement in Israel). On the 
distinction between “law as a tool” and legal techniques, see Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for 
the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 975 (2005) 
[hereinafter Taking on the Technicalities] (arguing that both instrumentalist and 
cultural/humanistic studies of law ignore the technical dimensions of legal form: “To the 
instrumentalist . . . the technical details of doctrine are interesting only insofar as they are 
relevant to what lawyers sometimes term ‘building a better mousetrap.’ They do not become the 
subject of any deeper or more critical inquiry.”); and see generally Alain Pottage, Law After 
Anthropology: Object and Technique in Roman Law, 31 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 147 (2014). 
13 See Annelise Riles, Law as Object, in LAW & EMPIRE IN THE PACIFIC: FIJI AND HAWAI’I, 187–212 
(Sally Engle Merry & Donald Brenneis eds., 2004) [hereinafter Law as Object]. 
14 Alain Pottage, The Socio-Legal Implications of the New Biotechnologies, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 321, 324 (2007). 
15 See generally JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 33–55, 85 (2010) (providing an account of the 
role of procedural fairness values in international law and international relations: “Interactional 
law undercuts the ability of powerful actors to put forward utterly self-serving or perverse 
normative claims, because the claims will have to be measured against the eight criteria of 
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transplanting Aboriginal justice methods into Euro-Canadian criminal trials, 
justice advocates intended to recognize Aboriginal peoples’ rights in the 
administration of justice.16 This then poses the following questions: How do 
legality, and will have to fit within shared understandings generated through inclusive 
participation of all social actors.”). For the most obvious example of melding instrumental and 
normative goals as the rule of law in Law and Development projects, see Kennedy, supra note 5, 
at 156–57 (providing an account of how human rights and the rule of law have been incorporated 
into the meaning of development); TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 2, at 4 (2008) (examining 
the role of the rule of law in development: “the claim that the robustness of a country’s 
commitment to the rule of law is an important determinant of its development trajectory rests 
upon both instrumental foundations and on intrinsic or deontological foundations.”). Another 
example is the proliferation of new jury and lay judge systems in Eastern Europe and East Asia 
in support of democratic reforms. See Hiroshi Fukurai et al., The Resurgence of Lay Adjudicatory 
Systems in East Asia, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. i, iii (2010) (comparing the “wave” of legal 
reforms to introduce lay judges in East Asia to trial by jury in the 19th Century, which “became 
an integral part of the emerging democratic societies in the U.S. and other nations on the 
European Continent”); Fukurai, supra note 3; Ryan Park, The Globalization of the Jury Trial: 
Lessons and Insights from Korea, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 525, 534–35, 546 (2010) (examining the 
connection between lay participation in judicial decision-making and “broader democratic 
governance,” and recounting the introduction of the jury trial as part of efforts to democratize 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s and South Korea in the late 1990s and early 2000s); Richard O. 
Lempert, The Internationalization of Lay Legal Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury 
Research, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477, 479 (2007); NIKOLAI KOVALEV, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 
IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND THE FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION: TRIAL BY JURY AND 
MIXED COURTS 2–3 (2010) (noting that many countries formerly part of the Soviet Union are 
introducing lay judge reforms, “transitioning” their criminal justice systems at the same time as 
undertaking political and economic transitions to democracy and free market economy). For more 
traditional portrayals of legal transplants as a consequence of pressure, prestige, or instrumental 
rationality, see generally Graziadei, supra note 6; La Porta et al., supra note 2; Ugo Mattei, 
Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 1, 16 (1994). 
16 MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), TASK FORCE ON ABORIGINAL 
PEOPLES IN FEDERAL CORRECTIONS, FINAL REPORT 10–11 (1988); PAUL L.A.H. CHARTRAND, 
ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE: A REPORT ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CANADA 3 (1996) [hereinafter BRIDGING THE 
CULTURAL DIVIDE] (“The right of Aboriginal self-government is argued to be a common law right 
in Canada, one that is protected by the Constitution. Aboriginal control over the substance and 
process of justice flowing from the Aboriginal right of self-government would permit the 
contemporary expression of Aboriginal concepts and processes of justice.”); ROYAL COMMISSION 
ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 610, 
679–81 (1996); John Giokas, Accommodating the Concerns of Aboriginal People Within the 
Existing Justice System, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 184, 184 (Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples eds., 1992) (“This paper has been written against the 
backdrop of this national and international drive of Aboriginal peoples for a greater degree of 
control over their own affairs. The basic theme of this paper can be summarized in one word: 
emergence. A new order is emerging in Canada that will cover most important aspects of the new 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians . . . . Justice administration is 
one of those areas.”); Donald Clairmont, Alternative Justice Issues for Aboriginal Justice, 36 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 125, 125 (1996); see R. v. Morin (I.) (1995), 134 Sask. R. 120, 
para. 27 (Can. Sask. C.A.) (“The very purpose of sentencing circles seems to be to fashion 
sentences that will differ in some mix or measure from those which the courts have up to now 
imposed in order to take into account aboriginal culture and traditions, and in order to permit 
and to take into account direct community participation in both imposition and administration of 
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we measure the impact, effects, or the extent of “translation”17 in such cases? 
What is the effect of transplanting legal institutions that are intended to 
fulfill both sociological and corrective justice goals?  What if, in addition to 
being an example of best practices, the legal transplant is also meant to 
signify a move toward repairing historical injustices?  
In 1992, Justice Barry Stuart of the Yukon Territorial Court used an 
approach based on local First Nations’ methods of dealing with crime.18 This 
was the first instance of adapting an Aboriginal healing circle for use in a 
Canadian criminal trial.19 Following Justice Stuart’s example, other trial 
judges began to conduct sentencing circles on an ad hoc basis as part of the 
discretion they had in sentencing decisions.20 By the mid-1990s, judicial 
innovation, legislative reform, and bureaucratic efforts effectively 
“transplanted” Aboriginal healing circles into the criminal trial. Presently, 
sentencing circles contribute to the institutionalized landscape to such an 
extent that in April 2014 the Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario) 
unveiled a new courthouse with rooms specifically designed for Aboriginal 
conferencing and ceremonies.21   
Sentencing circles are a legal procedure in which “the community offers 
its input to the sentencing court.”22 During a sentencing circle, criminal 
justice participants and members of the community have an opportunity to 
speak about the crime in question and its impact on the community.23 The 
the sentence.”); see also discussion of the Aboriginal Justice Initiative and Aboriginal Justice 
Strategy infra Part II.B. 
17 Langer, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
18 This first sentencing circle took place in Mayo, Yukon in R. v. Moses, [1992] B.C.W.L.D. 1294 
(Can. Y.K.T.C.), additional reasons provided in R. v. Moses, [1992] 71 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Can. 
Y.K.T.C.) and were as a result of consultations between the Kwanlin Dun First Nation and 
justice officials. THE CHURCH COUNCIL ON JUSTICE & CORRECTIONS, SATISFYING JUSTICE: A 
COMPENDIUM OF INITIATIVES, PROGRAMS AND LEGISLATIVE MEASURES (1996); see also BRIDGING 
THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 110. 
19 R. v. Nicholas (B.L.) (1996), 177 N.B.R. 2d 124 (Can. N.B.P.C.); BARRY STUART, BUILDING 
COMMUNITY JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS: COMMUNITY PEACEMAKING CIRCLES 124 (1997), 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2009/justice/J22-12-1997E.pdf. 
20 Heino Lilles, Circle Sentecing: Part of the Restorative Justice Continuum, INT’L INST. FOR 
RESTORATIVE PRACTICES (Aug. 9, 2002), www.iirp.edu/article_detail.php?article_id=NDQ3. The 
common law authority for conducting sentencing circles was found by Justice Sherstobitoff of the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. Morin (I.) (1995), 134 Sask.R. 120 (Can. Sask. C.A.). 
21 MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ABORIGINAL CONFERENCE SETTLEMENT SUITE FINAL 
REPORT (2009); Thunder Bay Courthouse—Adamson Associates Architects, ARCHDAILY, 
http://www.archdaily.com/511799/thunder-bay-courthouse-adamson-associates-architects/ (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2016). 
22 R. v. Cooper (2010), 101 O.R. 3d 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
23 Maureen Linker, Sentencing Circles and the Dilemma of Difference, 42 CRIM. L.Q. 116, 117 
(1999) (“The judge’s role is to oversee discussion and seek out answers to the following kinds of 
questions: What are the underlying causes of the crime? What impact has the crime had on the 
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number of participants can vary from ten to fifty individuals.24 In sentencing 
circles, which may last several hours, participants often make sentencing 
recommendations. At the conclusion of a sentencing circle that the court 
holds as part of an adult criminal trial, the participants return the matter to 
the court for final submissions and judicial decision. The law does not require 
the judge to follow the sentencing circle’s reccommendations.25 In many ways, 
though, sentencing circles represent an exception to the trend currently 
underway in common law countries to curtail lay participation in 
sentencing.26 Therefore, because sentencing circles involve significant 
community participation, it is important to analyze whether, and how, judges 
respond to sentencing circle recommendations in the final sentencing stage. 
 An additional goal of this Article is to identify and present a cultural 
turn in legal thinking, one in which the expressive genre of law (which 
generates and produces meaning)27 serves to mark and achieve other goals. 
This Article presents a story of legal pluralism, attempts at multiculturalism, 
Aboriginal law, and alternatives to criminal sentencing procedures. On a 
deeper level, however, it provides an account of legal instrumentalism and 
what it currently means to use law as a tool for social change. 
In Canadian sentencing reform, through an exercise in comparative 
criminal law,28 scholars, practitioners, and activists made Aboriginal culture 
into an object of knowledge29 and then constructed expressions of Aboriginal 
culture as instruments of legal value. Government studies and legal reports 
compared Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal approaches to justice, and 
victim, his or her family, and the community? What are the details of all the potential sentences . 
. . ?”). See, e.g., R. v. Van Bibber, [2010] Y.K.T.C. 49  (Can.); R. v. MacKendrick, [2007] 
B.C.W.L.D. 6450 (Can. B.C.P.C.) (finding that the “unusual nature and number of victims in the 
Langley community who were adversely affected” by the crime made the use of a sentencing 
circle even more poignant). But see Mary Crnkovich, A Sentencing Circle, 36 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 
& UNOFFICIAL L. 159, 165 (1996) (describing a sentencing circle that took place in the Nanuvik 
region of Quebec where the community’s role was unclear).   
24 Lilles, supra note 20. 
25 R. v. Taylor (1995), 132 Sask. R. 221, para. 10 (Can. Sask. Q.B.) (“It must be remembered that 
the recommendation of a circle is not binding on the sentencing judge.”); see also BRIDGING THE 
CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 110, 113–14; infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
discussion infra note 41. 
26 See Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State 
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885 (2004); Toby S. Goldbach & Valerie P. Hans, Juries, Lay Judges, 
and Trials, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Gerben Bruinsma & 
David Weisburd eds., 2014) (showing how in Canada, juries may give recommendations for 
parole in first and second degree murder trials; the law restricts lay participation to those 
circumstances, and jury recommendations are not mandatory). 
27 Law as Object, supra note 13.  
28 Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (2006). 
29 Law as Object, supra note 13; see generally MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW’S DREAM OF A COMMON 
KNOWLEDGE (2003). 
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connected sociological and political adversity with the need for justice reform. 
Advocates explicitly distinguished Aboriginal healing circles from official 
state procedures and then presented the former as an alternative dispute 
resolution process with equally legitimate jurisdictional claims. With that 
legal authority, culturally appropriate processes became an instrument that 
law reformers could use to address normative and sociological goals.  
Though often thought of as progressive in its pragmatic approach to law, 
there is a sense that legal instrumentalism, “the hegemonic logic of means 
and ends,”30 risks destabilizing developments in its effort to deem everything 
up for instrumental grabs. Therefore, instrumentalizing the expressive—
fashioning constructed expressions of culture into an instrument for use—
may present new and troubling implications for what it means to employ the 
law as a tool metaphor. Scholars, practitioners, and reformers should become 
more familiar with the ways that back and forth movement between the 
instrumental and the expressive present a moment of jeopardy for unmet 
expectations. In the very least, they should make use of the technical legal 
devices and knowledge practices to which legal intermediaries regularly 
appeal.31   
This Article employs a mixed methodology; it looks at government, task 
force, and law reform commission reports, as well as all published decisions 
where sentencing circles were requested and/or used. Part II reviews more 
thoroughly the background and situates the reforms in comparative law 
literature in order to give context to the kinds of conversations that were 
going on about how to change criminal sentencing in Canada. Readers might 
react negatively towards Aboriginal law analyzed within the framework of 
comparative law and legal transplants. Clearly, the histories of colonial 
relations and confrontations with indigenous communities, marked by 
paternalism and overt efforts to suppress culture, preclude adopting the “a-
political” comparative law analysis.32 However, one of the underlying goals of 
30 Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage, 
108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52, 60 (2006). 
31 See, e.g., Taking on the Technicalities, supra note 12; see generally Alain Pottage, The 
Materiality of What?, 39 J.L. & SOC’Y 167 (2012) [hereinafter The Materiality of What?]. 
32 See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International 
Governance, 2 UTAH L. REV. 545, 554 (1997) (Comparative law “see[s] itself as precisely not about 
politics or governance, as existing rather in the realm of history or thought, as an intellectual 
project of understanding between cultures whose similarities and differences are foregrounded.”). 
In particular, legal anthropologists might be concerned that commissions and task forces 
constructed an Aboriginal sentencing process. See, e.g., Martin Chanock, The Law Market: The 
Legal Encounter in British East and Central Africa, in EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW (W. J. 
Mommsen & J. A. de Moor eds., 1992); Marilyn Strathern, Discovering ‘Social Control’, 12 J. L. & 
SOC’Y 111, 111 (1985); Peter Fitzpatrick, Traditionalism and Traditional Law, 28 J. AFR. L. 20 
(1984). However, a sole focus on the expressive or meaning-making genre of law can overlook 
results of the second genre of law-making where law is a thing in the world. See Law as Object, 
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this Article is to present the example of transplanted Aboriginal methods as a 
means to disturb convenient encampments. By invoking the transplant 
metaphor and examining the types of questions comparative law scholars 
ask,33 this Article seeks to confront divisions between comparative law,34 
legal pluralism,35 and law and development literature.36 Sitting at the 
intersection of those three disciplines, sentencing circles are uniquely 
positioned to prompt readers to consider assumptions about whose law is fit 
for transplanting and the kinds of questions that are asked in certain areas of 
law. 
Part II chronicles a period of intense government scrutiny into Aboriginal 
confrontation with the criminal justice system, the initial legislative and 
judicial reforms, the subsequent transplantation, and the institutionalization 
of sentencing circles into the criminal trial.  
Part III adopts the typical comparative law and legal transplant 
approach, examining the process of transplantation and how sentencing 
circles fared once transplanted into the Euro-Canadian legal system. This 
Part presents a brief qualitative report of findings from all published 
Canadian decisions that dealt with sentencing circles, ranging from the first 
time a sentencing circle was held during a criminal trial in 1992 to decisions 
as recent as 2010.37 This Article analyzes the outcomes of requests to hold a 
supra note 13, at 190. Put most simply, sentencing circles have been incorporated, transplanted, 
and used in the criminal trial. So, it still bears worth to investigate how this played out. 
33 See Mitchel Lasser, The Question of Understanding, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: 
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 197, 197–239 (Pierre Legrand & R. J. C. Munday eds., 2003). 
34 Each of these sub-disciplines explores the movement of law and the interaction between 
culture, local needs, and official (state) legal orders, but they tend to adhere to their own 
constituencies: Comparative Law to European and North American audiences. See, e.g., THE 
COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 6; Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of 
Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997); Mathias Reimann, The 
Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 671 (2002). 
35 Legal Pluralism explores African or Western informal, customary, or religious legal orders as 
objects of study. See, e.g., MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL 
EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (Jim Lance ed.,1998);  Chanock, supra note 32; Fitzpatrick, 
supra note 32; Strathern, supra note 32; Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 
869 (1988). 
36 Law and development scholars examine developing states (as opposed to developing 
communities) in Latin America, Eastern Europe or North Africa. See, e.g., Pistor, supra note 5; 
Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253–300 (David Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); César Rodríguez-Garavito, Toward a Sociology of the Global Rule of 
Law Field: Neoliberalism, Neoconstitutionalisms, and the Contest Over Judicial Reform in Latin 
America, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 156–83 (Yves Dezalay 
& Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011). 
37 I chose December 2010 as the date to end data collection to provide a clean cut off point. I was 
also able to ensure I could access all the reported cases for that period, in case there was any 
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sentencing circle at the sentencing phase, as well as outcomes on sentencing 
after a sentencing circle was conducted. Part III proceeds within a framework 
of lay participation in law,38 arguing that the outcomes of incorporating these 
procedures should be judged against the kinds of goals that normally 
underlie lay and community participation in shaping sentences for convicted 
offenders. In this view, the ambiguous results become less important than the 
way those results were achieved.   
The discussion in Part IV challenges legal intermediaries to address the 
“transplant effect.”39 It suggests that judges have tools that can be employed 
to assess and process sentencing circle recommendations.40 Lay participation 
in sentencing has been all but eliminated in many jurisdictions—including 
Canada—so the ultimate authority for sentencing defendants resides with 
the judge.41 Nevertheless, this Article suggests that where lay participation 
and culture is instrumentalized, judges may need to employ the law’s 
technical contributions.42 The suggestion to use formalities or technical legal 
approaches to distill Aboriginal procedures may seem odd. However, part of 
this Articles’s is to query whether decoupling legal formalism from legal 
techniques43 might mediate the risks associated with instrumentalizing 
normative and expressive goals. 
delay between the decision and the reporting of the case.  Admittedly, 2010 is an arbitrary cut off 
point, but, as there have not been any significant changes to the Criminal Code or to the way 
sentencing circles are being conducted, I have no reason to believe that the conclusions that I will 
draw are in any way affected by this cut off point.  
38 See Goldbach & Hans, supra note 26.  
39 Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 167.  
40 See infra Part IV.  
41 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 720, s. 745, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 155; 1995 c. 22, s. 6; 
2015, c. 13, s. 23. Sentencing proceedings are carried out by the court, except where a jury finds 
an accused guilty of second degree murder, guilty of murder where the accused has a prior 
conviction for murder, or where the accused was under the age of sixteen; in these cases, the 
judge must give the jury the option to make a non-binding recommendation on the period the 
accused is required to serve before being eligible for release on parole. See Neil Vidmar, The 
Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 148 
(1999); Goldbach & Hans, supra note 26, at 2721.  
42 See, e.g., Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique: 
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589, 594–95 (2012); Law as 
Object, supra note 13, at 1026–27. 
43 See ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 70–71 (2011) [hereinafter COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE] (arguing that an ethnography of 
legal expertise must include a close examination “of the skill and the art, the aesthetics and the 
bricolage, the satisfaction of rehearsing and perhaps innovating upon or adding to a set of moves 
and postures one has observed, apprenticed, debated with other initiates,” which is 
distinguishable from legal formalism, “the view that legal form constrains politics”); see also 
VALVERDE, supra note 29, at 28 (distinguishing between socio-legal scholarship, which examines 
the ways that law, formally applied, reproduces forms of power relations, and the study of the 
“mechanisms” by which law produces or “constitutes” knowledge). 
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II. COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Justice Studies 1967–1995 
The Canadian government transplanted Aboriginal healing circles into 
the Canadian criminal trial following a cross-national exercise that analyzed 
Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal justice system using a 
comparative law methodology. Starting from the position that the 
relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the criminal justice system 
needed to change, government sponsored inquires focused on the conflict 
between justice values and principles by comparing Aboriginal and Euro-
Canadian approaches to crime.44  
Between 1967 and 1995, provincial and federal levels of government 
sponsored more than thirty justice studies45 regarding the causes and effects 
of systemic discrimination against Aboriginal people.46 For example, the Task 
Force on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis 
People of Alberta assigned former Chief Judge of the Provincial Court, 
Justice Allan Cawsey, a mandate “to complete a review of the criminal justice 
system in Alberta as it relates to Indian and Metis people.”47 The Alberta 
Task Force combined submissions from law organizations, researchers, and 
native groups with statistical data. Similarly, the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (“RCAP”) heard testimony at public hearings, accepted 
submissions from organizations funded through an intervener participation 
program, sponsored research studies, and organized national “round tables” 
on Aboriginal issues, which brought together academics, practitioners, 
politicians, and community leaders.48   
First, task forces, inquiries, and royal commissions sought to understand 
why and how the criminal justice system negatively affected Aboriginal 
44 Individual scholars also took on the task of investigating the conflicts between justice and 
values. See, e.g., JAMES S. FRIDERES & RENÉ R. GADACZ, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN CANADA (7th ed. 
2004); RUPERT ROSS, DANCING WITH A GHOST: EXPLORING INDIAN REALITY (1992). 
45 Dara Culhane, Justice and Healing: Aboriginal Peoples in Canada, 6 J. HUM. JUST. 140, 151 
(1995). 
46 In addition to the reports and commissions cited in the text, see GOV’T OF CANADA ET AL., 
REFLECTING INDIAN CONCERNS AND VALUES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM  (1985); CHIEF JUSTICE T. 
ALEXANDER HICKMAN ET AL., ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE DONALD MARSHALL, JR., PROSECUTION: 
DIGEST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1989); JUDGE PATRICIA LINN, FED’N OF SASK 
INDIAN NATIONS ET AL., REPORT OF THE SASKATCHEWAN INDIAN JUSTICE REVIEW COMMITTEE 
(1992); TASK FORCE ON FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN, CREATING CHOICES: THE REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN (1990). 
47 TASK FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS 
PEOPLE OF ALBERTA, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS PEOPLE OF ALBERTA, 1-1 (1991). 
48 James S. Frideres, The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: The Route to Self-
Government?, 16 CAN. J. NATIVE STUD. 247, 247–53 (1996). 
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offenders.49 They examined feelings of alienation, as well as the 
disproportionate representation of Aboriginal offenders in provincial and 
federal prisons.50 For example, RCAP’s comprehensive report found that, in 
Saskatchewan, a treaty Indian boy of sixteen had a 70 percent chance of 
serving a prison term by the age of twenty-five, while a non-Native 
Saskatchewan boy only had an 8 percent chance.51 Comparing populations 
with penal statistics also illustrated the extent of over-incarceration.52 In the 
49 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16, at 23, 28; ALVIN 
HAMILTON, A FEATHER, NOT A GAVEL: WORKING TOWARDS ABORIGINAL JUSTICE 49, 61 (2001) 
(describing the efforts of the Aboriginal justice inquiry in Manitoba to learn about structural 
impediments to justice and the particular discrimination in effect in Winnepeg: “Aboriginal city 
residents . . . described their personal experiences with police brutality, the courts’ indifference 
and the oppression of bigotry and discrimination . . . .”); see also Daniel Kwochka, Aboriginal 
Injustice: Making Room for a Restorative Paradigm, 60 SASK. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (1996). 
50 MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16, at 5, 23; JAMES DUMONT, 
JUSTICE AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLE 29–32 (1990) (examining the differences between Aboriginal 
approaches to justice and “expectations of the legal system” in a paper written for the Public 
Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People. Practices common in the Euro-
Canadian legal system may seem “culturally and ethically foreign and opposing,” and 
“[d]ifferences in value orientation causes [sic] significant differences in behavior, and where 
Native people come into the legal context of the dominant society the situation appears to foster 
behavioral conflicts within the courtroom as well as with enforcers of the law.”); Giokas, supra 
note 16, at 187 (“Aboriginal over-representation is affirmed by report after report documenting 
the high contact rates of Aboriginal people with police and their disproportionately high rates of 
arrest, conviction and imprisonment. Over-representation in prisons and jails is now an 
acknowledged fact, and there is every indication that the problem may be worsening, given that 
the federal Aboriginal inmate population is increasing at more than twice the national rate.”); 
Carol LaPrairie, The Role of Sentencing in the Over-Representation of Aboriginal People in 
Correctional Institutions, 32 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 429, 429 (1990) (“For the 
past two decades, virtually, everything written and discussed in the area of aboriginal people 
and the criminal justice system has used as its starting point the over-representation of 
aboriginal people as inmates in federal, provincial, and territorial correctional institutions.”). 
51 William D. Coleman, Bridging the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People and 
Criminal Justice in Canada, 29 CAN. J. OF POL. SCI. 784, 785 (1996). 
52 MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16, at 5, 24; TASK FORCE 
ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS PEOPLE OF 
ALBERTA (CANADA), supra note 47, at 6–4 (“It is a well known and historically persistent fact 
that the Aboriginal peoples of Alberta have been dramatically and proportionately over-
represented in jails and penitentiaries. Task Force research has determined that, over the past 
five years, the percentage of Aboriginals in jail has ranged from 29.7% to 31.5% for the total 
Aboriginal population. For 1989, the most recent year, the percentage is 31.1% compared to a 4% 
to 5% representation of the general population of Alberta.”); see also Tim Quigley, Are We Doing 
Anything about the Disproportionate Jailing of Aboriginal People?, 42 CRIM. L.Q. 129, 157 (1999) 
(noting the proportion of Aborignial offenders who are incarcerated rather than fined greatly 
exceeds their population); LaPrairie, supra note 50, at 429 (“aboriginal people comprise 
approximately 1.5–2% of the Canadian population but make up approximately 8–10% of the 
federal correctional institutional population and considerably more in provincial and territorial 
institutions . . . for certain aboriginal groups such as women and juveniles, the rates may be even 
more extreme”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE CAN., FINAL EVALUATION ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY 12 
(2000), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2007/jus/J3-6-2000-1E.pdf [hereinafter 
ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2000] (“Aboriginal people continue to be 
overrepresented among admissions to adult correctional facilities, as 15% of provincial/territorial 
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early 1990s, Aboriginal people made up between 2–3 percent of the total 
population of Canada, yet they made up 10–15 percent of the penitentiary 
population.53 In certain areas, the proportions may have been much higher. 
In 1992, in the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta 
Aboriginal people represented approximately 15 percent of the population, 
but their percentage of total prison population might have been as high as 60 
percent.54  
Initially, researchers attributed this over-incarceration of Aboriginal 
offenders to high levels of crime and facially neutral policies that negatively 
impacted Aboriginal offenders.55 In particular, researchers blamed 
sentencing practices for over-incarceration and Aboriginal offenders’ feelings 
of alienation.56 Carol LaPrairie, who worked as a researcher for the 
Department of Justice, wrote:  
admissions are Aboriginal peoples, while they represent 2.8% of the general Canadian 
population . . . . The [Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics] reported that in 1997/98, the total 
percentage of Aboriginal peoples sentenced to provincial/territorial probation was 12%—over 
four times the proportion of Aboriginal people in the Canadian population.”); see generally, A. C. 
HAMILTON & C. M. SINCLAIR, REPORT OF THE ABORIGINAL JUSTICE INQUIRY OF MANITOBA ch. 4 
(1991). 
53 POPULATION BY ABORIGINAL GROUPS AND SEX, SHOWING AGE GROUPS, FOR CANADA, 1996 
CENSUS (20% SAMPLE DATA), STATS. CAN. CATALOG NO.  93F0025XDB96002, 
www.statcan.gc.ca/c1996-r1996/jan13-13jan/c1996-r1996-eng.pdf (last visted Feb. 12, 2016); 
CANADIAN CENTRE FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS PROFILE SERIES, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN CANADA 
(2001); see ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 30, 41 (1993); R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 719 (Can.) (“If overreliance upon 
incarceration is a problem with the general population, it is of much greater concern in the 
sentencing of aboriginal Canadians. In the mid-1980s, aboriginal people represented about 2 
percent of the population of Canada, yet they made up 10 percent of the penitentiary population. 
In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, aboriginal people constituted something between 6 and 7 
percent of the population, yet in Manitoba they represented 46 percent of the provincial 
admissions and in Saskatchewan 60 percent. The situation has not improved in recent years.  By 
1997, aboriginal peoples constituted closer to 3 percent of the population of Canada and 
amounted to 12 percent of all federal inmates.”). 
54 ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra note 53. 
55 See, e.g., BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 41 (citing reports that found 
Aboriginal offenders more likely than non-Aboriginals to plead guilty even when they do not 
believe themselves to be guilty, and they were also less likely to benefit from plea bargains).  
56 ROBERT A. SILVERMAN & MARIANNE O. NIELSEN, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND CANADIAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 122–23 (Robert A. Silverman & Marianne O. Nielsen eds., 1992) (“Dealing 
with courts means dealing with the central most important issue to Native people (or others) 
who find themselves facing a conviction for a violation of criminal law—and that is sentencing.” 
The Crown was less likely, in 1975, to offer a plea bargain to Aboriginal offenders and Aboriginal 
“cultural traits” were misinterpreted, negatively impacting Aboriginal offenders); REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS 
PEOPLE OF ALBERTA, supra note 47, at 6-1 (reviewing submissions and statistical data on 
recidivism and concluding that “the imposition and enforcement of sentences had very little 
impact on Aboriginal persons.”); BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 309 (“The 
Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples of Canada—First Nations, 
Inuit and Metis people, on-reserve and off reserve, urban and rural—in all territorial and 
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Nowhere else is the use of the criminal justice system to 
address a major social and economic problem so potentially 
problematic as it is in relation to [A]boriginal people. It is this 
group which appears to be incarcerated for less serious 
offences because its members do not qualify for probation, and 
few options but incarceration are available to judges.57 
Ultimately, reports explained Aboriginal confrontation with the criminal 
justice system as a conflict between two sets of justice values.58 By comparing 
Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal justice principles and approaches to crime, 
inquiries revealed the extent to which the criminal justice system was alien 
and oppressive to Aboriginal people.59 For example, Judge Murray Sinclair, 
Co-Commissioner of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, compared 
Euro-Canadian punishment and deterrence approaches to Aboriginal justice 
principles. While acknowledging that there was no universal Aboriginal 
conception of justice, he explained an Aboriginal conception of justice “would 
be that of restoring peace and equilibrium to the community through 
reconciling the accused with his or her own conscience and with the 
individual or family that [was] wronged.”60 By comparison, Euro-Canadian 
justice considers offenders to be harmful to society and punishes them in 
order to deter harmful, deviant behavior by that offender and others in the 
future.61  
governmental jurisdictions.  The principal reason for this crushing failure is the fundamentally 
different world views of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people with respect to such elemental 
issues as the substantive content of Justice and the process of achieving Justice.”) 
57 LaPrairie, supra note 50, at 437. 
58 See, e.g., DUMONT, supra note 50, at 28; Leonard Mandamin, Aboriginal Justice Systems, in 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 275, 281 (Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples eds., 1993) (“For Aboriginal people the emphasis is on restoration and healing rather 
than punishment”); BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 309; Murray Sinclair, 
Aboriginal Peoples, Justice and the Law, in CONTINUING POUNDMAKER AND RIEL’S QUEST: A 
COMPILATION OF THE PRESENTATIONS MADE AT A CONFERENCE ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND 
JUSTICE 178 (Richard Gosse et al. eds., 1994) (“. . . the question should be restated as: ‘What is 
wrong with our justice system that Aboriginal people find it so alienating?’ . . . . [The starting 
point] requires one to come to terms with the concept that Aboriginal Peoples of North America, 
for the most part, hold world views and life philosophies fundamentally different from those of 
the dominant Euro-Canadian society, and that these belief systems and approaches to life are so 
fundamentally different as to be inherently in conflict.”); see generally REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN AND METIS PEOPLE OF 
ALBERTA, supra note 47; HAMILTON & SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at ch. 2; see also Kwochka, supra 
note 49, at 159–60. 
59 See, e.g., DUMONT, supra note 50, at 32; MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), 
supra note 16, at 28–31; BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16, at 58 (“It is difficult 
and disturbing to realize that Aboriginal people see the non-Aboriginal justice system as alien 
and repressive, but the evidence permits no other conclusion.”). 
60 Sinclair, supra note 58. 
61 Id. 
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In its position paper on incarceration, the Community Holistic Circle 
Healing Program: Hollow Water First Nation,62 also compared the two 
approaches to justice as follows:  
Our tradition, our culture, speaks clearly about the concepts 
of judgement and punishment. They belong to the Creator. 
They are not ours . . . . People who offend against another 
(victimizers) are to be viewed and related to as people who are 
out of balance—with themselves, their family, their 
community, and their Creator. A return to balance can best be 
accomplished through a process of accountability that 
includes support from the community through teaching and 
healing. The use of judgement and punishment actually 
works against the healing process. An already unbalanced 
person is moved further out of balance . . . .   
The adversarial approach also places the victimizer against 
his or her community. As we see it, this goes against the very 
essence of the healing process. For us, healing (breaking the 
cycle) is based on (1) the victimizer taking full responsibility 
for his/her actions, (2) the victim understanding and 
integrating this into day-to-day living, and (3) the 
COMMUNITY being able to support, assist, and/or hold 
accountable all the parties of the victimization. Until this can 
happen, and as long as incarceration is seen as the solution, 
the community will not be a safe place.63 
Because of these fundamentally different worldviews of justice, 
Aboriginals participating in the non-Aboriginal justice system was itself an 
experience of colonization.64  Task forces and commissions found that 
assuming greater responsibility for the delivery and administration of justice 
62 The Hollow Water Initiative serves First Nation and Metis in four communities: Manigotagan, 
Aghaming, Seymourville, and Hollow Water. For additional information about the Community 
Holistic Circle Healing Program, see ED BULLER, ABORIGINAL COMMUNITY HEALING PROCESSES 
IN CANADA 3–8 (2005). 
63 THE CHURCH COUNCIL ON JUSTICE & CORRECTIONS, supra note 18, at XXIII-XXV. 
64 BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16 (“In making the case for Aboriginal control of 
‘Justice’, the RCAP begins by recognizing that [it] has been through the law and the 
administration of justice that Aboriginal people have experienced the most repressive aspects of 
colonialism. The RCAP then proposed that it is in Aboriginal law, with Aboriginal law and 
through Aboriginal law that Aboriginal people aspire to regain control over their lives and 
communities. The establishment of systems of Aboriginal justice is seen as a necessary part of 
throwing off the suffocating mantle of a legal system imposed through colonialism.”). These 
issues are examined more closely in Toby S. Goldbach, Sentencing Circles, Clashing Worldviews, 
and the Case of Christopher Pauchay, 10 ILLUMINE: J. OF THE CTR. FOR STUD. IN RELIGION AND 
SOC’Y GRADUATE STUDENTS ASS’N 53, 66–68 (2011). 
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was imperative, and65 most agreed that Aboriginal people possessed the legal 
and constitutional authority to administer justice.66 Canada identified two 
options: (i) recognize the right to a separate parallel justice system for 
Aboriginal people, or (ii) incorporate Aboriginal justice into the existing 
criminal justice system.67 
B. Bridging the Gap 
During the 1990s, Canadian authorities effectively transplanted 
Aboriginal healing circles as “sentencing circles” into the criminal trial. This 
alternative sentencing theory, and others, presented an attractive remedial 
approach that recognized Aboriginal authority to administer justice. Since 
Canadian criminal scholars and practitioners were already attacking the 
foundations of deterrence and incarceration in response to crime,68 Aboriginal 
65 See COMMUNICATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, NATIVE PEOPLES AND 
JUSTICE: REPORTS ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE AND THE FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE 
ON NATIVE PEOPLES AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 14–16, 25–26, 38 (1975) (explaining that 
many of the reports and commissions attribute sentencing conflict to Aboriginal exclusion from 
the design and delivery of justice services in Canada. It was at the National Conference on 
Native Peoples and the Criminal Justice System that concern about Aboriginal experience was 
first linked to Aboriginal exclusion from the design and delivery of justice services: “The 
following guidelines . . . were regarded and adopted . . . as a statement of general philosophy 
underlying any approach to the problems of natives within the criminal justice system. 1. Native 
persons should be closely involved in the planning and delivery of services associated with 
criminal justice and native peoples. 2. Native communities should have greater responsibility for 
the delivery of criminal justice services to their people . . . .”).  
66 See, e.g., BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16; James C. MacPherson, Report from 
the Round Table Rapporteur, in ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 6 (“One of the 
more promising themes of the Round Table was the absence of potential jurisdictional 
impediments to reform in the justice area . . . most of the participants at the Round Table 
appeared to agree with Patrick Macklem’s analysis in his paper dealing with the relationship 
between the current constitutional framework in the justice field and new Aboriginal justice 
systems. Professor Macklem stated, ‘In my view, neither the current distribution of legislative 
authority nor the judicature provisions pose any serious impediment to the establishment of a 
separate or parallel system of justice for Aboriginal people, although federal-provincial co-
operation may be required to vest Aboriginal courts with jurisdiction over certain subject 
matters.’”). 
67 Giokas, supra note 16, at 201 (“The solutions most commonly discussed are a separate justice 
system for aboriginal peoples, parallel systems or considerable accommodation within the 
existing justice system.” Giokas argued that both projects “must be undertaken to eliminate 
systemic discrimination . . . there must be movement on these two simultaneous projects: 
developing internal community justice structures; and improving the overall justice system. The 
latter can be accomplished on the basis of the many recommendations to this effect in the various 
inquiry reports and can be begun on a unilateral basis by government. Both levels of government 
have already started on this latter project, however haltingly, and will no doubt outline their 
efforts to this Commission in another forum.”); ROYAL COMM’N ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, supra 
note 53; see also SILVERMAN & NIELSEN, supra note 56. 
68 See CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING REFORM: A CANADIAN APPROACH: 
REPORT OF THE CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION xxviii (1987) (Deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and incapacitation “are clearly pragmatic,” nevertheless: “[e]vidence does not support the notion 
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justice advocates could burrow themselves within the larger debates about 
sentencing. Despite vast differences, law reformers, judges, and scholars 
began to acknowledge parallels between “informal justice” approaches that 
stressed communitarianism and interdependency,69 and Aboriginal methods 
for dealing with harm to the community.  
Specifically, researchers pointed to the potential of restorative justice to 
bridge the gap between Aboriginal and Euro-Canadian approaches to 
sentencing.70 Aboriginal and restorative justice approaches were seen as 
overlapping in their goal to heal “the relationships that have been 
jeopardized by the wrongdoer’s behavior.”71 Given that North America, 
Europe, Australia, and New Zealand had already begun to implement 
restorative justice initiatives scholars, practitioners, and law reformers could 
that variations in sanctions . . . affect the deterrent value of sentences. In other words, 
deterrence cannot be used, with empirical justification, to guide the imposition of sentences. 
There are no comprehensive data that support the idea that courts can . . . impose sanctions that 
have a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitating offenders . . . .[And, the] extensive literature on 
incapacitation suggests that as a crime-control strategy the costs of imprisonment far outweigh 
the benefits achieved in reducing crime.”); STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE & SOLICITOR 
GENERAL, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND 
SOLICITOR GENERAL ON ITS REVIEW OF SENTENCING, CONDITIONAL RELEASE AND RELATED 
ASPECTS OF CORRECTIONS (1988); see also Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing in Canada: The Context 
for Reform, 32 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 381 (1990) (summarizing federal 
government initiatives, as well as the work of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, to 
produce proposals for sentencing reform focused on the reduction of imprisonment); Anthony N. 
Doob & Voula Marinos, Reconceptualizing Punishment: Understanding the Limitations on the 
Use of Intermediate Sanctions, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 413, 417–21 (1993) (tracing the 
movement to support non-prison forms of punishment by reviewing the history of federal 
government initiatives to reform sentencing in Canada; and specifically noting statements by the 
Canadian Sentencing Commission chair, “a former Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer 
known for his far-right views on criminal justice matters, [which] stunned many observers by 
explicitly rejecting . . . the view that increased imprisonment would reduce levels of crime in 
Canadian society”). 
69 Carol LaPrairie, Aboriginal Crime and Justice: Explaining the Present, Exploring the Future, 
34 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 281, 282 (1992). 
70 See, e.g., LAW COMM’N. OF CAN. & DENNIS COOLEY, FROM RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO 
TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE DISCUSSION PAPER (1999) (stating that a restorative justice 
‘movement’ began in the early 1970s based on work done with two young offenders arrested for 
vandalism in Kitchener, Ontario. Within the criminal justice system, restorative justice 
frequently consisted of victim-offender reconciliation and family group conferences. Family 
conferencing is an excellent example of why restorative justice and Aboriginal approaches to 
justice should not be conflated. Family group conferencing relies on the family’s ability to evoke 
shame and show disapproval, which contradicts certain Aboriginal culture and justice practices); 
Kwochka, supra note 49, at 156 (arguing that recommendations to include Aboriginal 
involvement in the design and delivery of justice services “having more recognition of Aboriginal 
culture and law” are most promising “because they fit with a new and vibrant philosophy of 
criminal justice . . . [which] involves a fundamentally different approach to the criminal justice 
system that can be loosely characterized under the heading of ‘restorative justice.’”); Quigley, 
supra note 52, at 144 (“Restorative justice is a throwback to the ways of dealing with wrongdoing 
in many indigenous societies.”); Lilles, supra note 20. 
71 Quigley, supra note 52, at 144. 
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appeal to “culturally appropriate” programs within already existing 
structures.72 Eventually, perceptions about Aboriginal approaches to crime 
converged with the idea of restorative justice.73 For example, in a case 
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in February 2000, Justice Iacobucci, 
on behalf of the Court, wrote: “most traditional [A]boriginal conceptions of 
sentencing hold restorative justice to be the primary objective,” and their 
“approaches place a primary emphasis on the goal of restorative justice.”74 
In 1996, Canadian lawmakers codified a broader movement away from 
deterrence and incapacitation in new sentencing provisions of the Canadian 
Criminal Code.75 Thus, transplanted Aboriginal methods received legislative 
support and increased exposure. Based on the recommendations of a Federal 
Standing Committee on sentencing, the federal government enacted 
sweeping changes to the Criminal Code, including new provisions expressly 
articulating the purposes and principles of sentencing. Still in force, Section 
718 outlines the purposes of sentencing for all offenders, including restorative 
and reparative justice goals.76 In addition to denunciation, deterrence, and 
other traditional sentencing objectives, judges can also craft sanctions “to 
promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the 
harm done to victims or to the community.”77 Section 718.2 introduces “other 
sentencing principles,” which requires judges to take into account the goals of 
predictability and ensures that the offender’s liberties are not deprived if less 
restrictive measures are appropriate.78  More pointedly, Section 718.2(e) 
72 MINISTRY OF SOLICITOR GENERAL, OTTAWA (ONTARIO), supra note 16; see also LAW REFORM 
COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE EQUALITY, 
RESPECT, AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE AS REQUESTED BY THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE UNDER 
SUBSECTION 12(2) OF THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION ACT (1991) (stating that with “very little 
adjustment,” restorative justice programs in place in Correctional Services would be able to 
“incorporate customary law, thus increasing their acceptability to the affected population”). But 
see Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse in Canada: 
Litigation, ADR, and Restorative Justice, 52 U. TORONTO L. J. 253 (2002) (presenting an opposing 
view). 
73 Llewellyn, supra note 72; see, Lilles, supra note 20 (explaining the process of ‘circle sentencing’ 
as an example of a restorative justice initiative).  
74 R. v. Wells, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, paras. 37–38 (Can.). 
75 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s. 718(e)–(f). In addition to the principles of deterrence and 
denunciation, the criminal code states that “just sanctions” include the objectives of providing 
reparations, and promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledging harm done 
to victims. The new sentencing provisions also introduced Alternative Measures (s. 717) and the 
Conditional Sentence of Imprisonment (s. 742) as options for sentencing offenders. See discussion 
of conditional sentencing infra note 80.  
76 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s. 718 (a)–(f) (stating that the objectives of sanctions 
include: (a) denunciation, (b) deterrence, (c) removal, (d) rehabilitation, (e) reparations, and (f) 
promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders).  
77 Id. s. 718(f). 
78 Id. s. 718.2(b), (d). 
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mandates that judges consider all alternatives to imprisonment and give 
“particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.”79 
Some judges were already conducting sentencing circles prior to these 
amendments pursuant to their discretion. However, these amendments to the 
Criminal Code gave judges legislative authority to transplant Aboriginal 
practices into the criminal trial.80 Courts held that the sentencing principles 
delineated in Section 718.2(e) instruct judges to consider those sentencing 
procedures that may be appropriate because of the offender’s Aboriginal 
heritage. For example, in a case decided shortly after the new sentencing 
provisions came into effect, Alberta Provincial Court Justice Marshall 
interpreted 718.2(e) as providing the legal authority to conduct a sentencing 
circle. Regarding the language “with particular attention to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders,” Justice Marshall wrote:  
This suggests to me that additional tools that are unique to 
[A]boriginal people such as sentencing circles, traditional 
healing methods, respect for the advice of elders, etc., should 
be utilized where reasonably possible and that special 
recognition should be given to the native traditional way of 
life, and the effects that the removal from that community, 
and way of life, would have upon an [A]boriginal offender. 
Such an approach, it is hoped, would make the justice system 
more just, meaningful and acceptable to the aboriginal 
people.81  
Considering the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders goes beyond 
merely inquiring into the offender’s socio-economic circumstances. It also 
requires a different approach and a willingness to address crime by utilizing 
those additional tools, which include sentencing circles, that are available to 
Aboriginal offenders as members of that community. 82  
79 Id. s. 718.2 (“A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following 
principles . . . (e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the 
circumstances . . . should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the 
circumstances . . . of Aboriginal offenders.”). 
80 In addition to directing judges to consider express statements of the purposes and principles of 
sentencing, the amendments to the Criminal Code introduced the conditional sentence of 
imprisonment as a sentencing option. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, s. 742.1 
(explaining that if the offense is not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence and the final 
sentence is for a period of less than two years, the judge can order a term of imprisonment to be 
served in the community rather than in a correctional facility). Conditional sentences greatly 
impact the use of sentencing circles in criminal trial by providing a framework and a form of 
sentence for the types of recommendations that sentencing circles often craft. See infra Part 
III.B. 
81 R. v. R. (H.) (1997), 205 A.R. 226, para. 53 (Can. Alta. P.C.). 
82 The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to consider Section 718.2 (e) in Gladue, 1 
S.C.R., and then shortly thereafter in Wells, 1 S.C.R. In Gladue, the Court noted the emergence 
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During roughly the same period sentencing circles were being 
transplanted into the criminal trial, the Aboriginal Justice Initiative (1991–
1996), and its successor, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy (1996–present), 
provided a bureaucratic structure for Aboriginal justice programs.83 The 
federal government—in cooperation with Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada, the Privy Council Office, the former Office of the Solicitor General 
(now Public Safety Canada), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police—
developed initiatives to foster programs that could “be the foundation of long 
term administration of justice improvements within the framework of the 
Canadian law for Aboriginal people.”84 In partnership with provincial and 
territorial governments, the federal government funded “community-based 
justice programs” on a cost-sharing basis, which included sentencing circles, 
training, and development related to justice programs.85  
of “innovative sentencing practices, such as healing and sentencing circles, and aboriginal 
community council projects, which are available especially to [A]boriginal offenders.” 1 S.C.R. ¶ 
74. While it declined to discuss sentencing circles in detail, the Court did write that “[t]he 
background considerations regarding the distinct situation of [A]boriginal peoples in Canada” 
included “[t]he types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the 
circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.” 
Id. ¶ 66. 
83 DEPT. OF JUSTICE CAN., ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION FINAL REPORT (2011) 
[hereinafter ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2011]; DON CLAIRMONT & JANE 
MCMILLAN, DIRECTIONS IN MI’KMAQ JUSTICE: AN EVALUATION OF THE MI’KMAQ JUSTICE 
INSTITUTE AND ITS AFTERMATH 12–13 (2001) (describing the Aboriginal Justice Directorate’s 
(“AJD”) emphasis on restorative justice and community justice committees: “The major emphasis 
of the [Aboriginal Justice Learning] Network [an initiative of the AJD] has been on restorative 
justice, linking aboriginal traditions and preferences (e.g., circle sentencing) with new 
developments such as family group conferencing.”). 
84 ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2000, supra note 52, at i. 
85 ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2011, supra note 83, at 5. The government also 
funded program development for communities that did not have Aboriginal Justice Strategy 
funded programs. Id. Since 1996, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy has been renewed twice for five 
year mandates. Id. at 5. In 2006–07, the fund supported approximately 100 programs. Id. at  5. 
By 2011–12, it funded 214 community programs. Id.  In fiscal year 2013–2014, the federal 
government spent $11 million funding the Aboriginal Justice Strategy, with a total commitment 
to provide $22.2 million over two years. Aboriginal Justice Strategy, CANADA’S ECON. ACTION 
PLAN, http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/initiative/aboriginal-justice-strategy (last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
Aboriginal Justice Strategy funded “Community Justice Committees” that often arrange 
sentencing circles; they may specify procedures to be followed prior to, and at the sentencing 
circle, make decisions about who participates in the circle, and may also identify a local 
community leader to act as keeper of the circle. See generally ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY 
EVALUATION 2000, supra note 52, app. A. For example, the Yukon Tribal Council Community 
Based Justice Initiative developed protocols and guidelines for sentencing circles, and the Elders 
Panel of the Waywayseecappo Aboriginal Justice Program sits with the provincial court and 
offers recommendations on sentencing. Id. at 81, 92. See also R. v. Johns (J.C.), [1995] 
B.C.W.L.D. 299, para. 9 (Can. Y.K.C.A.) (describing the application process to the Kwanlin Dun 
Community Justice Committee for a sentencing circle, and the process to set up a rehabilitation 
program before the sentencing circle is held); R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, paras. 30–31 (Can.); 
R. v. Van Bibber, [2010] Y.K.T.C. 49, para. 31 (Can.) (noting the role of the Northern Tutchone 
Council, also funded by the Department of Justice through the Aboriginal Courtwork Program, 
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III. SENTENCING CIRCLE OUTCOMES 
A. Sentencing Circles in the Criminal Trial 
Following standard comparative law and legal transplant methodology,86 
this Part examines the effects of importing Aboriginal healing circles into the 
sentencing phase of the criminal trial. This section presents data compiled 
from a review of all adult criminal trials and appeals dealing with sentencing 
circles to see how the reforms operate in action and to what extent the system 
is receptive to the new legal transplant.87  
Before presenting this data, this Article introduces the issues and 
concerns via a difficult, but emblematic, case. The facts are as follows. 
Sometime between midnight and 5:00 AM, a father lost his two daughters in 
the field by his house.88 He was attempting to cross the field to get to his 
brother-in-law’s house to find help for his youngest daughter who he thought 
was hurt.89 “Both girls died of hypothermia.”90 The father “pled guilty to 
criminal negligence” causing death.91 At trial, he asked for a sentencing circle 
to be held.92 The court granted the request, held the sentencing circle, and 
then delivered the sentence, which included a three-year prison term in a 
federal penitentiary.93   
The level of controversy and vitriol around the judge’s decision to hold the 
sentencing circle was robust. One reporter likened a sentencing circle to “a 
group hug for both victims and offenders.”94 Another intimated that given the 
chance, the sentencing circle’s recommendation to the defendant would be to 
“go stand outside in a snowbank until you’re a Popsicle.”95 Against these 
in conducting the sentencing circle); see also, STUART, supra note 19, at 33; Clairmont, supra 
note 16, at 131–146 (discussing the Indian Brook justice initiative in Nova Scotia in comparison 
to Aboriginal justice programs in Northern Ontario and Metropolitan Toronto). 
86 Lasser, supra note 33; Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 100 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003); 
Langer, supra note 8.  
87 Berkowitz et al., supra note 6. 
88 R. v. Pauchay (2009), 328 Sask. R. 173, paras. 14–18 (Can. Sask. P.C.). 
89 Id. ¶ 18.  
90 Id. ¶ 17. 
91 Id. ¶ 1. 
92 Id.  
93 R. v. Pauchay (2009), 333 Sask. R. 167, paras. 1, 69 (Can. Sask. P.C.) [hereinafter R. v. 
Pauchay (II)]. 
94 Kevin Libin, Sentencing Circles for Aboriginals: Good Justice?, NAT’L POST (Feb. 27, 2009, 8:01 
PM), http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1337495. 
95 Colby Cosh, Squaring the Circle on Justice, NAT’L POST (Nov. 7, 2008), 
http://www.nationalpost.com/opinion/story.html?id=4252cc77-d93f-4749-a757-fd54fe8fd229. 
                                                                                                                                          
Winter 2015] SENTENCING CIRCLES IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL TRIALS 83 
protestations stands the amount of time and effort the community expended. 
Twenty-three people participated in an inner circle including: the victims’ 
mother, two members of the community who sat as surrogates for the 
victims, the defendant’s parents, senior elders from Sturgeon Lake First 
Nation and the Yellow Quill First Nation, interpreters, the judge, and other 
justice representatives.96 Another fifty to sixty people observed.97 The circle 
met for five hours. In advance of the sentencing circle, member of the reserve 
spent additional time in healing circles held by the defendant’s family.98 In 
addition, a mental health specialist conducted interviews to prepare an 
intervention strategy.99  
The participants made various recommendations. For example, the 
mental health specialist recommended intervention strategies, such as 
workshops to teach parenting and life skills, mentoring programs for youths, 
and a helpline for children.100 A community elder recommended that 
defendant serve the elders, acting as a cultural helper and assisting with 
ceremonial duties, such as setting up rocks for sweat lodges and filling and 
lighting pipes before ceremonies.101 The defendant would be required to 
abstain from alcohol and drugs while in that role and would receive guidance 
from the elders.102  The role would be for life and serve as “a reminder that 
the Creator had not left him.”103 
When he announced the decision, the judge thanked the participants, 
noting that the sentencing circle had given him “valuable insight” into the 
community’s views of the problems it faces.104 The judge, however, noted that 
he did not have the authority to order something that would amount to 
probation for more than three years.105 His decision was that a proper 
balancing of the sentencing principles required incarceration for three 
96 R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 47. 
97 Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 56. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 59; R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 48. 
100 Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 59; R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 48 (providing a 
statement by the court regarding the recommendations made by the mental health specialist: 
“Dr. Raj Hathiramani, the mental health therapist at Yellow Quill First Nation, provided a 
comprehensive community healing plan that contained twelve specific recommendations, some 
that were designed to address community issues well beyond the scope of the Sentencing Circle”). 
For a discussion on  judicial recitation of sentencing circle recommendations see infra Part IV.  
101 R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 51. 
102 Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 57. 
103 R. v. Pauchay (II), supra note 93, para. 51. 
104 Id. ¶ 53. 
105 Id. ¶ 69. 
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years.106 He wrote that it would be up to Mr. Pauchay, following his 
incarceration, to decide whether he wanted the support of the Yellow Quill 
First Nation.107 
It seemed everyone did everything right; an alternative, culturally 
appropriate process was used and the judge engaged in the proper legal 
analysis. Yet, because so many people spent so much time to work on 
recommendations—only to have the judge say “thank you”—one can easily 
find themselves frustrated and perturbed when reading the case. Again juries 
are generally not involved in sentencing in Canada, but once we do involve 
the community and ask them to participate, is there any duty on the judge to 
adopt any part of the sentencing recommendations or to consider them in a 
particular way? 
B. Requests for Sentencing Circles 
Taking a macro view, what follows is a review of the treatment of 
sentencing circles in all cases where judges considered them during the 
course of an adult criminal trial under the Canadian Criminal Code.108 A 
search for the phrase “sentencing circle” and “circle sentencing” generated 
103 distinct hits.109 These 103 hits included motions, final declarations or 
dispositions on sentencing, appellate level decisions of cases relating to 
sentencing circles, as well as cases that referred to the sentencing circle 
process, but where sentencing circles were not actually conducted in the trial. 
The cases were initially divided according to whether they related to 
requests for sentencing circles, trials where sentencing circles were held, or 
cases where the parties appealed. Appeals could consist of reviews of 
decisions of whether to hold a sentencing circle, or reviews of the sentence 
106 Id. 
107 Id.  
108 This will capture all published criminal trial decisions in Canada. Through online databases, 
such as LexisNexis, Quicklaw, and the Canadian Legal Information Institute (“CanLII”), 
Canadian courts publish all judgments on criminal code matters, including appellate decisions 
and decisions of lower and higher court judges who are provincially and federally appointed, 
respectively. What this does not include are cases that are diverted from the criminal justice 
system, and young offenders who may go through the sentencing circle process, but whose 
decisions remain unpublished. Therefore, there will be an amount of activity that is not covered 
by this review. However, in so far as the reforms were meant to provide Aboriginal communities 
with authority over the design and delivery of justice services, implementation and outcomes 
within the adult criminal trials provide highly relevant information. 
 
109 The initial search did not yield R. v. Moses, [1992] B.C.W.L.D. 1293 (Can. Y.K.T.C.). The judge 
in that case, Territorial Court Judge Stuart, only used the terms “circle process” or “circle 
discussions.” Moses, [1992] 71 C.C.C., paras.  81, 86, 100, 103, 110, 113, 169. The data presented 
in this Article includes R. v. Moses because it is widely acknowledged as the first case where this 
process was used. The data includes the first case and reflects the transition in judicial discourse 
towards referring to the process as “circle sentencing” or a “sentencing circle.” 
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itself when a sentencing circle was held. Of the cases that were reviewed, 
there were forty-eight cases in which a request for a sentencing circle was 
made to a judge.110 Of the forty-eight cases in which a defendant made a 
request before a judge to hold a sentencing circle, judges allowed a circle to be 
held in thirty-seven cases.111 The table below indicates the number of 
requests for sentencing circles per year. 
 
Table 1: Did the judge allow a request for a sentencing circle? (1992-
2010) 
 
Viewed in the  aggregate, the data seems to indicate that judges were 
favorable to allowing sentencing circles. However, the data looks different 
when focusing on reported decisions in which the judge actually considered 
the request as a motion on the merits. Of the sixteen cases where the request 
110 These forty-eight cases include decisions in which the judge documented the disposition on a 
formal application to the court in a distinct decision, as well as cases where a disposition was 
inferred from reported sentencing decisions or appellate level decisions. In some of the decisions, 
the court had already held a sentencing circle and the trial judge delivered the sentence. In those 
cases, either the Crown consented to the request for a sentencing circle or the judge held a 
hearing but did not write reasons regarding the request. See, e.g., R. v. Kahypeasewat (2006), 
284 Sask. R. 55, paras. 62–66 (Can. Sask. P.C.) (court held a sentencing circle; judge only wrote 
reasons for the final decision on sentencing). The Crown consented to the holding of a sentencing 
circle in R. v. Manyfingers (C.J.) (1996), 191 A.R. 342 (Can. Alta. P.C.); R. v. Paul (D.) (1998), 203 
N.B.R. 2d 243 (Can. N.B.P.C.); and R. v. Brooks, [2008] N.S.P.C. 58 (Can.). The data tabulating 
requests for sentencing circles is presented in Appendix A of this Article.  
111 For the full list of cases, see Appendix A.  
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was contested, or the judge considered it as a motion on the merits and wrote 
reasons for the decision, judges denied eleven of the requests for a sentencing 
circle.112 In three cases, the judge held a hearing or discussed reasons for 
allowing a sentencing circle even though the Crown already consented.113 
The table below shows no discernible trend in the number of requests 
allowed over the examined period, which suggest consistency in judicial 
attitudes towards conducting sentencing circles. Although, there was a 
considerable decline in requests for sentencing circles between 1998 and 
2004, which may be the result of unfavorable decisions in early appeals of 
trials that implemented sentencing circles.114   
In all jurisdictions, judges developed criteria to consider in determining 
whether a particular case was appropriate for a sentencing circle. In 
Saskatchewan, trial courts consider seven criteria, which were originally 
articulated by Provincial Judge Fafard in R. v. Joseyounen.115 British 
Columbia trial courts adopted these seven criteria,116 whereas the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal reviewed the criteria and 
adopted five of the seven factors for their courts.117 The relevant factors that 
judges consider when determining whether to allow a sentencing circle 
present similar themes, especially with regard to issues relating to the 
accused, the victim, and the community’s participation. The table below 
amalgamates the criteria, which appear across all provinces, and identifies 
112 See Appendix A.  
113R. v. Nicholas (B.L.) (1996), 177 N.B.R. 2d 124 (Can. N.B.P.C.); Paul (D.), 203 N.B.R. 2d 243; 
Brooks, [2008] N.S.P.C. 58, para. 2 (referring to principles set out in R. v. J. (J.) (2004), 244 Nfld. 
& P.E.I.R. 24 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. C.A.) on whether to allow a request for a sentencing circle, 
however, the Court indicates that the Crown’s consent made it unnecessary to determine the 
issue of the request); see also R. v. Stick (C.) (2001), 202 Sask. R. 306, para. 10 (Can. Sask. Q.B.) 
(stating that, on appeal, the court determined that the trial court judge erred by reversing his 
prior decision to allow a sentencing circle without hearing submissions from the parties).   
114 Luke McNamara, Appellate Court Scrutiny of Circle Sentencing, 27 MANITOBA L.J. 209, 225 
(2000). 
115 R. v. Joseyounen, [1995] 6 W.W.R. 438 (Can. Sask. P.C.). The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
approved Fafard’s criteria in R. v. Morin (I.) (1995), 134 Sask. R. 120 (Can. Sask. C.A.), and then 
again in R. v. Munson (2001), 214 Sask. R. 26 (Can. Sask. Q.B.). The seven criteria are: (1) the 
accused must agree to be referred to the sentencing circle; (2) the accused must have deep roots 
in the community; (3) there are elders or respected non-political community leaders willing to 
participate; (4) the victim is willing to participate and has been subjected to no coercion or 
pressure; (5) the victim has counseling made available and is accompanied by a support team if 
she has battered spouse syndrome; (6) disputed facts have been resolved in advance; and, (7) the 
Court is willing to depart from the usual range of sentencing.  
116 R. v. Pena (M. J.) (1997),148 D.L.R. 4th 372 (Can. B.C.S.C.). 
117 J. (J.), 244 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 24; see also STUART, supra note 19. 
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which factors were considered when denying a request for a sentencing 
circle.118  
Table 2: Which factors were considered in denying a request for a 
sentencing circle? 
 
Factors to consider in 
allowing/denying request for 
sentencing circle 
# of times 
referred to as 
reason for 
denying request 
Province and 
Court,119 Year 
of Decision 
Accused does not appear to have 
accepted responsibility 2 
BC SC, 1997 
SK QB, 2001   
Court is not willing to take a 
calculated risk 3 
SK QB, 1993  
SK PC, 2006 
SK QB, 2009 
Accused does not have deep 
roots in community 2 
SK QB, 1993 
BC SC, 1997   
Community is not willing to 
participate 3 
BC CA, 2001  
SK QB, 2001 
BC PC, 2004 
Victim is not willing to 
participate 3 
NF SC, 1994  
SK CA, 2004 
SK QB, 2009 
Other120 3 
BC SC, 1997 
SK QB, 2001   
SK QB, 2005 
118 Joseyounen, [1995] 6 W.W.R. 438 (demonstrating Judge Fafard’s criteria and factors were 
delineated by Judge Grotsky in R. v. Cheekinew (1993), 108 Sask. R. 114 (Can. Sask. Q.B.), but it 
does not include Fafard’s factors regarding whether the facts were agreed upon and whether the 
accused agreed to be referred to a sentencing circle, as there were no cases that were denied for 
these reasons. A more appropriate or accurate way to deal with issues involving the accused is to 
query whether the accused sufficiently accepted responsibility for his or her actions before 
involving the victim and the community in a joint process). 
119 Court of Appeal (“CA”) and Superior Court (“SC”) are higher-level courts with federally 
appointed judges, and Provincial Court (“PC”), is a lower level trial court with provincially 
appointed judges. 
120 Other reasons for denying a request for a sentencing circle included: concern that the 
discussion was going to be outside the normal scope of sentencing circles and about the charge 
rather than about the accused, see R. v. Stick (C.) (2001), 202 Sask. R. 306 (Can. Sask. Q.B.); 
concern that it was not appropriate to sever sentencing processes, see Pena (M.J.), 148 D.L.R. 
4th 372; and, concern that the victims were numerous and the community was divided in support 
or anger of the multiple accused, see R. v. Gopher (2005), 270 Sask. R. 175 (Can. Sask. Q.B.). 
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Judges across each province apply tests or criteria to determine whether 
a sentencing circle is appropriate in a particular case.121 The list of factors for 
the tests or criteria were developed and modified as individual judges 
referred to similar judicial action in other provinces.122 It should also be 
noted that in the Newfoundland and Labrador case referred to above,123 the 
Court of Appeal went out of its way to identify that the trial judge’s mistake 
was not the decision to allow a sentencing circle, rather, the judge failed to 
consider whether the relevant criteria was met.124 The appellate court 
concluded that the trial judge erred:  
not because he used a sentencing circle. (That may or may not 
have been an appropriate decision in the exercise of his 
discretion.) He did so, rather, because there were relevant 
factors that he should have considered, but that he did not 
(or, at least, there is no record of his ever having considered 
them).125  
C. Sentencing Circle Recommendations 
Once the trial judge allows a sentencing circle, the court will adjourn for 
a period of time to allow for necessary preparations.126 Participants who 
121 Judges in Yukon, Ontario, and Alberta considered similar criteria to those laid out by judges 
from Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador. See supra notes 114–120; 
see, e.g.,  R. v. Manyfingers (C.J.) (1996), 191 A.R. 342, paras. 125–27 (Can. Alta. P.C.) (reviewing 
the Saskatchewan and British Columbia tests and holding that “[n]o matter what procedure is 
followed, it must be based on high legal standards”); R. v. L. (B.) (2002), 266 W.A.C. 78, paras. 7, 
39–53 (Can. Alta. C.A.) (finding that the trial judge erred by not dealing with disputed facts as to 
the extent of the defendant’s involvement in the crime prior to conducting the sentencing circle, 
and noting that (i) there were no members of the community present that were not related to the 
accused, and (ii) the victim’s wife, who was the victim of the crime, was not presnet because of 
her condition). Yukon courts have fewer published decisions at the request stage, but decisions 
on sentencing indicate that the court considered: the defendant’s voluntary participation; 
community support; participation of the victim; and the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility  
See  R. v. Van Bibber, [2010] Y.K.T.C. 49, para. 78 (Can.); R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 
31 (Can.). 
122 See supra notes 114–118. 
123 See R. v. J. (J.) (2004), 244 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 24, para. 1 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. C.A.). 
124 Specifically, the court points to the following criteria “to be used in deciding whether or not a 
sentencing circle should be used: (1) Willingness and Suitability of the Convicted Person . . . (2) 
Willingness of the Victim (Freely Given) . . . (3) Willingness of the Community to Participate . . . 
[and] (4) Whether the Offence Required a Term of Imprisonment.” Id. ¶ 73. The court held that 
the judge failed to adequately consider three of these four criteria. Id. 
125 Id. ¶ 74.  
126 See, e.g., R. v. Morris, [2004] B.C.W.L.D. 807, paras. 1, 25 (Can. B.C.C.A.) (reporting that the 
defendant pled guilty on July 22, 2003, and the sentencing circle was held on February 13, 2004); 
R. v. Nicholas (B.L.) (1996), 177 N.B.R. 2d 124 , paras. 1–3 (Can. N.B.P.C.) (reporting that the 
defendant pled guilty on January 8, 1996, and the sentencing circle was held on March 25, 1996); 
R. v. Pauchay (2009), 328 Sask. R. 173 (Can. Sask. P.C.);  R. v. Pauchay (2009), 333 Sask. R. 167 
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normally appear during the sentencing phase of the trial, including the 
defendant, defense counsel, the Crown, the police, social workers, and the 
judge, also participate in the sentencing circle.127 Additionally, the victim and 
members of his or her family, as well as members of the defendant’s family 
and other members of the community will also be present.128 Talking about 
the crime and its impact is meant to be an educational experience, where the 
defendant learns about why and how his or her actions had a negative 
impact.129 It is also an opportunity for participants to discuss larger socio-
economic issues facing the community.130 At the conclusion, the circle will 
present recommendations for sentencing to the judge.131 The court adjourns 
for final submissions, and then the judge delivers the sentence.  
(Can. Sask. P.C.) (stating that the request for the sentencing circle was granted on January 7, 
2009, the circle was held on February 13, 2009, and the Crown and defense counsel made final 
submissions on sentencing on March 4, 2009); R. v. Kahypeasewat (2006), 284 Sask. R. 55 (Can. 
Sask. P.C.) (“The accused plead guilty to manslaughter on September 26, 2005. In May 2006, a 
sentencing circle was held.”). Pre-sentencing reports are also prepared in the interim. But see R. 
v. Johns (J.C.), [1995] B.C.W.L.D. 2996 (Can. Y.K.C.A.) (stating that preparations for the 
sentencing circle were done before the conviction phase and that “[b]y the time Mr. Johns 
attended court to plead guilty and to be sentenced, he had completed a 30 day residential alcohol 
treatment program in Cardston, Alberta and had been sober for eight months.”). 
127 STUART, supra note 19, at 48–51 (discussing the role of court personnel before and during the 
sentencing circle); Lilles, supra note 20, at 81–82 (noting that at the beginning of the proceedings 
the charges are read, and Crown and defense counsel will make brief opening statements). 
128 See, e.g., R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 33 (Can.) (noting that the sentencing circle “was 
conducted on two separate days. Thirty people were present on the first day, February 6, 2006, 
including three of the victims in the car driven by Jodie MacMillan, her father and the parents of 
the third person, Ainslinn Cornett. A number of their close friends were also in the Circle 
supporting them. Twenty people were in the Circle on the second day, April 19, 2006, including 
the victims and/or their family members.”); R. v. Poker (2006), 261 Nfld. & P.E.I.R., para. 54 
(Can. Nfld. & Lab. T.D.) (“There were twenty participants in the circle which was under the 
direction of Mr. Apenam Pone as the Circle Keeper and a well-respected Innu man in his own 
right as counsellor for the Innu people of Sheshatshiu.”); see also Lilles, supra note 20, at 81 
(estimating that between fifteen and fifty people usually attend the sentencing circle); STUART, 
supra note 19, at 45 (discussing the importance of pre-circle preparation). 
129 Lilles, supra note 20, at 84; STUART, supra note 19, at 9, 86 (“All the circumstances of the 
offender, victim, and offence are examined to understand the underlying causes of the crime in 
order to appreciate what relationships must be healed and strengthened—and called upon in 
developing a healing plan.”). 
130 See, e.g., Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 35 (stating that participants discussed “the 
frequency of drinking and driving in the Yukon and how people driving to and from work are at 
risk.”); R. v. Kahypeasewat, 284 Sask. R., ¶ 62 (noting that the circle discussed “the dynamic of 
the offence”); Lilles, supra note 20, at 81 (stating that topics at a sentencing circle often include: 
“[t]he extent of similar crimes within the community; [t]he underlying cause of such crimes; [a] 
retrospective analysis of what life in the community had been before crime became so prevalent; 
[t]he impact of these sorts of crimes on victims generally, on families and community life . . . .”) 
(ellipses removed). 
131 See, e.g., R. v. J. (J.) (2004), 244 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 24, para. 2 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. C.A.) (“It was 
the recommendation of the Sentencing Circle that Mr. Poker be permitted to serve whatever is 
left of his sentence in the Community of Natuashish under the direction of the counsellors there . 
. . and with the help of the elders that they would offer whatever assistance they could to get Mr. 
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It is important to analyze how judges treat sentencing circle 
recommendations in the final sentencing decision. With respect to the cases 
discussed in this Article, judges accepted the recommendations of sentencing 
circles in eighteen of the thirty-seven reported cases.132 However, in seven of 
those cases, the Crown successfully reversed the sentence on appeal.133 The 
table below shows the number of sentencing circle recommendations from 
1992 to 2010. During this span, trial judges accepted recommendations in 
eighteen cases and explicitly rejected them in seven cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poker back on track again.”); R. v. Taylor (1995), 132 Sask. R. 221, para. 1  (Can. Sask. Q.B.) 
(noting that the “consensus” of the community participants “was that Taylor should be banished 
to an island for the period of one year and if he completes this period of banishment then he 
should be put on probation for three years with conditions that he attend a program on sexual 
abuse, anger management and alcoholism and that he would not have contact with the victim for 
a period of three years from the commencement of the probation); R. v. Paul (D.) (1998), 203 
N.B.R. 2d 243, para. 15 (Can. N.B.P.C.) (noting that the court delivered the sentence, after 
considering “all relevant principles and the concerns and recommendations of the circle,” which 
included banishment); R. v. Elliot, [2006] A.B.P.C. 372, para. 34 (Can. Alta. P.C.) (noting that the 
sentencing circle recommendations “were presented to the court to assist the court in 
sentencing.”). But see R. v. Morris, [2004] B.C.W.L.D. 807, paras. 25, 75–76 (Can. B.C.C.A)  
(noting that because of the victim’s concerns, “the circle proceeded more as a broad discussion of 
themes than for the specific purpose of formulating recommendations for sentencing . . . .” But, 
the court later notes that the trial judge’s conditions for probation, namely “hosting a potlatch; 
organizing a Man's Talking and Sharing Circle; and completing the community service hours . . . 
parallel the recommendations which emerged from the talking circle held on 13 February 2004 . . 
. .”); Kahypeasewat, 284 Sask. R. 55, para. 62 (stating that participants at the sentencing circle 
“were given an opportunity to provide input into sentencing options”). 
132 See infra Appendix B for cases where sentencing circles were held, by case, year, and court. 
133 In total, the Crown appealed over one third of the cases—seventeen out of forty-seven—in 
which sentencing circles were requested or held. Defense council appealed only one out of 
eighteen circle sentences. Moreover, the Crown succeeded in thirteen of its seventeen appeals. 
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Table 3: Did the Judge Accept the Sentencing Circle’s 
Recommendations? 
 
 
A troubling statistic remains that the status in twelve of the thirty-seven 
cases in which sentencing circles were held and recommendations given are 
unknown. In these twelve decisions, the trial judge neither specified the 
nature of the recommendations made by the sentencing circle participants, 
nor whether the recommendations were followed. In some cases, the judge did 
impose a conditional sentence, which may indicate that the judge accepted 
the circle’s recommendations,134 although such acceptance is impossible to 
confirm. The chart below revises the data in Table 3 to include decisions that 
do not discuss the specific recommendations made by sentencing circle 
participants.   
 
Table 4: Did the Judge Accept the Sentencing Circle’s 
Recommendations [Revised]? 
134 See discussion supra note 80. 
0
1
2
3
4
Yes No
0
1
2
3
4
Yes No Unknown
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Canadian criminal procedure does not require judges to disclose the 
details of pre-sentencing information in their sentencing decisions.135 
Consequently, in the twelve cases where the trial judge did not note the 
details of the recommendations, the judge may have treated sentencing circle 
recommendations in the same manner as other pre-sentencing 
information.136 On the other hand, there were several instances where judges 
treated sentencing circle recommendations quite differently from pre-
sentencing reports or information.137 For example, in R. v. Labelle (B.), the 
judge dealt with the sentencing circle recommendations as if they were part 
of a negotiated agreement that would become valid once endorsed by the 
court.138  
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Debates in Comparative Law 
In Part III we saw that there was a transplant effect, especially at the 
final sentencing stage, where judges were unsure what to do with sentencing 
circle recommendations.139 Why does this matter? How is this case different 
from any other legal problem where there is a transplant effect? This Article 
proposes that there is a difference when the transplant is undertaken not 
only because it represents best practices, but also because those best 
practices represent cultural and humanistic goals. Furthermore, this Article 
argues that there are increased risks when normative and cultural 
expressions are instrumentalized. This occurs when the expressive genre of 
law, which attempts to reflect the world, is used as an instrument,140 and, 
when this happens, its implementation, outcomes, and transplant effects 
must be examined.  
To examine the instrumental value of sentencing circles within the 
Aboriginal culture it is important to evaluate scholarship in comparative law. 
Wigmore, a legal scholar in the area, defines comparative law as “the tracing 
135 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 ss 721–726.2 (Can.). 
136 In fact, in some decisions, the judge expressly likened the circle’s recommendations to 
information or reports, which are submitted to the court at, or prior, to sentencing. See, e.g., R. v. 
Naappaluk (1993), 25 C.R. 4th 220 (Can. C.Q.); R. v. Brooks (2008), 331 N.B.R. 2d 268, paras. 9–
11 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 13 (Can.) (noting in an opinion written by 
Judge Heino Lilles regarding the sentencing circle as comparable to a victim impact statement). 
137 In the same case where he compared the sentencing circle process to a victim impact 
statement, Judge Lilles’ remarks seemed to imply that the sentencing circle was actually 
deliberating on an appropriate sentence. See Craft, [2006] Y.K.T.C. 19, para. 61. That decision 
reads more like a judicial review than a distinct sentencing process. 
138 R. v. L. (B.) (2002), 266 W.A.C. 78, (Can. Alta. C.A.). 
139 Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 175–76. 
140 Taking on the Technicalities, supra note 12, at 1027–28.  
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of an identical or similar idea or institution through all or many [legal] 
systems, with a view to discovering its differences and likenesses in various 
systems, the reasons for those variations, and the nature and limits of the 
inherent and invariable idea . . . .”141 However, Wigmore does not ask to what 
objective are comparisons made—to acquire a body of knowledge or map legal 
traditions?142 What exactly do we compare when we engage in an exercise of 
comparative law?143 
Comparative law scholars compare legal systems that face the same, 
universal problems.144 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz wrote that the 
purpose of comparative investigations is always functional and 
instrumental,145 while particular legal institutions and different laws are 
meant to solve social problems that are similar among these institution.146 
Thus, comparative law allows scholars to discover the best practices, of both 
legal rules and institutions, which one legal system can transplant to 
another.147 Comparative law scholars also consider functionality when 
deciding which laws to compare because, “incomparables” cannot 
productively be contrasted while “those which fulfill the same function” can 
be.148  
According to these “social purpose functionalists,”149 functionally 
equivalent legal institutions are transported between legal systems for their 
improvement. The view that imported legal institutions address social, 
economic, or political goals is solidly entrenched in a broader history of 
thinking that views law as a tool and society as a site that needs fixing.150 
141 John H. Wigmore, Comparative Law: Jottings on Comparative Legal Ideas and Institutions, 6 
TUL. L. REV. 48, 51 (1932). 
142 Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 
Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 673–77 (2002). 
143 Id. at 686. 
144 Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 356–58 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) 
(referring to the idea that “similar functional needs can be fulfilled by different institutions,” and 
noting that “the recognition of functional equivalents gave a boost to the possibilities for 
comparative law,” which the author refers to as “Equivalence Functionalism”). 
145 ZWEIGERT & KÖETZ, supra note 9, at 34. 
146 Nils Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 305, 323–338 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
147 Hill, supra note 5, at 109. 
148 ZWEIGERT & KÖETZ, supra note 9. 
149 Fernanda G. Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 777, 
794 (2010). 
150 RUDOLF VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husic trans., 1914); BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (2001); SUMMERS, supra note 12. 
Legal scholars in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries who criticized the formalist approach to 
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“Legal instrumentalism”—the idea of law as a tool or a means to an end—is 
currently at the center of American legal thinking.151 In many ways, law’s 
instrumentality is also what makes it interesting as an object of study.152 
Those who derogate from the law as a tool axiom appear to challenge a whole 
ontology of law.153  
The “culturalists” could be said to constitute a second group of 
comparativists.154 These scholars hold to the Savigny/Montesqui idea of 
l’Esprit de loi155—that positive law is the spirit of the people.156 In this group, 
scholars are less sanguine about the possibilities of transplanting whole legal 
rules or institutions. These scholars believe that law is part of a cognition or 
culture157 that societies accept158 or translate.159 Thus, societies cannot 
transport best practices.160 Scholarship among this group ranges in a 
judicial decision-making argued in favor of a pragmatic and sociological judicial process; law is a 
technology that lawmakers—as sociological engineers—employ to achieve their goals. See 
Malcolm M. Feeley, Three Voices of Socio-Legal Studies, 35 ISR. L. REV. 175 (2001). Scholars may 
disagree about which goals to pursue or which ways to pursue them, but they can generally 
agree that law is a means to an end. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, THE PERILS OF 
PERVASIVE LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM (2006). 
151 TAMANAHA, supra note 150; SUMMERS, supra note 12, at 179. 
152 Law as Object, supra note 13; The Materiality of What?, supra note 31. 
153 It may be for this reason that there is not as much a conversation about legal instrumentalism 
as there are rumblings of dissatisfaction and disorientation in the form of isolated self-reflections 
about the failure of particular projects. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The 
Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 
(2008); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on 
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974); 
Merryman, supra note 1; Robert Dingwall, A Stranger at the Table: Reflections on Law, Society, 
and the Higgs Boson, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 29 (2002). For complaints about discrepancies 
between law on the books and law in action, see Feeley, supra note 150. 
154 Taking on the Technicalities, supra note 12, at 106; Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and 
Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 709, 710–11 (Mathias Reimann 
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).  
155 Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony Distinction and its Place in the Global 
Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 811, 811 (2010); Nicola, supra note 149.  
156 Wigmore, supra note 141, at 51 (“. . . a legal institution can be fully comprehended only in the 
light of the social, economic, religious, political, racial, and climatic circumstances which 
surround it.”). 
157 Louis F. del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur, Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on 
the Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2010). 
158 Langer, supra note 8; see also Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in 
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995). 
159  Berkowitz et al., supra note 6; see also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN 
LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 8–9 (1980) (discussing the unsuccessful attempts 
to transplant and develop U.S. legal frameworks in developing countries due to a lack of 
understanding “local language, law, polity, economy, or culture”). 
160 Pistor, supra note 5.  
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spectrum from weak cultural theorists, who believe that legal institutions 
transfer between legal families,161 to strong theorists, like Legrand who argue 
that because national or local culture determines the nature and specifics of 
legal institutions, it never make senses to talk about legal transplants.162 In 
comparative law and scholarship on legal transplants, this could be referred 
to as the “does culture matter”163 debate.  
B. Objectification of Legal Knowledge  
The commissions and task forces that investigated Aboriginal 
confrontation within the criminal justice system were clearly situated on the 
culture side of this debate. Aboriginal justice advocates saw conceptions of 
justice as “integrally related to that society’s world views and life 
philosophies.”164 Reports noted vast differences between Euro-Canadian and 
Aboriginal approaches to righting legal wrongs—Aboriginal approaches 
sought restoration and healing, whereas Euro-Canadian criminal justice 
sought deterrence and punishment.165 This conflict between two sets of 
justice values produced feelings of alienation and contributed to over-
incarceration of Aboriginal offenders.166 Culture mattered. 
On the other hand, the exercise in comparative law—comparing Euro-
Canadian and Aboriginal approaches to justice—was instrumental. 
Researchers sought to show how traditional Aboriginal healing circles and 
the sentencing phase of the criminal trial were functionally similar, 
addressing the same social problem: crime in the community. Comparing 
Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal approaches had a purpose. It was an effort to 
look at “foreign” law to assist with a criminal law “domestic” reform 
project.167 Aboriginals’ feelings of alienation and negative experiences 
originated in the incompatibility between two justice systems and 
worldviews,168 but ultimately the source of the problem—that law and culture 
161 See generally THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 6. 
162 See Legrand, supra note 34, at 122; see also Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not 
Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 52, 81 (1996). 
163 See generally Amartya Sen, How Does Culture Matter?, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION 37–
58 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., 2004). 
164 HAMILTON & SINCLAIR, supra note 52, at 59. Individual scholars were coming to similar 
conclusions. See, e.g., ROSS, supra note 44; FRIDERES & GADACZ, supra note 44; DIVERSITY AND 
JUSTICE IN CANADA (Douglas E. King & John Winterdyk eds., 1999); ROSS GORDON GREEN, 
JUSTICE IN ABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES: SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES (1998). 
165 See DUMONT, supra note 50; Mandamin, supra note 58; see also ROYAL COMMISSION ON 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES: LOOKING 
FORWARD LOOKING BACK 218 (1996); ROSS, supra note 44; FRIDERES & GADACZ, supra note 44. 
166 See DUMONT, supra note 50, at 30–32; Giokas, supra note 16, at 187. 
167 See Dubber, supra note 28, at 435–36. 
168 See Goldbach et al., supra note 8, at 19. 
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were intertwined—could also provide the solution. Those conceptions of 
justice, integrally interwoven with worldviews, could be used as a tool to 
address over-incarceration and the negative experience of Aboriginal 
offenders. Aboriginal justice so clearly provided a solution, that in 1996 
Robert Depew wrote, “[p]erhaps more than any other expanding alternatives-
to-the-State movement in Canada, ‘popular justice’ for [A]boriginal 
communities has been embraced by its advocates as a solution to a range of 
unique justice problems faced by [A]boriginal communities.”169  
Ralf Michaels argues that scholars often over-estimate the possibility 
that legal systems will converge by ignoring entrenched legal paradigms, for 
example, in determining jurisdiction for private law matters.170 A similar 
problem exists here, as law reformers sought to harmonize alternative 
dispute resolution methods with Aboriginal justice approaches. Those 
scholars and practitioners, who advocated adapting Aboriginal methods for 
dealing with harm to the community, were optimistic171 about the 
possibilities of transplantation when the “origin” and “host” legal systems 
had contrasting and entrenched legal paradigms.172  
This case study, however, represents more than merely an example of 
harmonizing systems with entrenched legal paradigms or transplanting legal 
institutions into unreceptive legal systems.173 In addition, these transplanted 
sentencing circles are an example of instrumentalizing the expressive. 
Scholars, practitioners, and reformers articulated the legal expression of 
Aboriginal culture. They conveyed the meaning of Aboriginal justice as a way 
to identify that group and its particular concerns,174 and then turned that 
meaning back on itself in order to serve a useful function. 
 Sentencing circles represent both kinds of objectification of legal 
knowledge: they are a reflection of Aboriginal culture, and they are a “thing 
in the world”175—a process that takes place at the sentencing phase of the 
criminal trial. Here, though, the two genres of legal acts176—the expressive 
and instrumental genres—are integrated and conflated. The fact that 
sentencing circles could serve as an identifier of Aboriginal culture and stand 
169 Robert C. Depew, Popular Justice and Aboriginal Communities: Some Preliminary 
Considerations, 36 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21, 22 (1996). 
170 Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1047–48 (2006).  
171 See Merryman, supra note 1; Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 154. 
172 Goldbach et al., supra note 8. 
173 See Berkowitz et al., supra note 6. 
174 Law as Object, supra note 13, at 192. 
175 Id. at 190. 
176 See generally id. 
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in for traditional healing circles in the Euro-Canadian trial was instrumental 
to the reformers’ goals. 
Of course, overlap and intermingling of the instrumental and the 
expressive in lawmaking is not unique to this Canadian case study. This 
arises when law and development literature points to rule of law or 
democratic freedom as the key to progress,177 when state department 
programs link gender equality indicators with national security,178 or when 
scholars point to constitutionalism as an organizing concept or archetype in 
legal thought.179 Canada’s reform of criminal sentencing procedures, 
however, stands as a particularly poignant example of this movement toward 
cultural and normative goals. It also brings to light the hazards associated 
with material “things in the world” and the difficulties in mixing the material 
with the symbolic.180 Reformers had some expectations about the 
transcendent aspects of sentencing circles, but sentencing circles are also 
concretely present. Sentencing circles are procedures in which real people—
defendants, victims, and community members—participate.   
C. Introducing Legal Techniques 
177 See, e.g., Santos, supra note 36; Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 315–18 (2004); Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: 
Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 199, 202–03 
(2004) (“at least at the rhetorical level, social issues have now been accepted both as ends of 
development in and of themselves and as important factors to the achievement of general 
economic growth. As a result, issues ranging from human rights to gender equality no longer 
stand outside the development agenda, nor is their importance to economic development still 
seriously debated.”); Daniel M. Brinks et al., Social Rights Constitutionalism: Negotiating the 
Tension Between the Universal and the Particular, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 289, 290–91 
(2015) (examining “the increasing inclusion of social and economic rights language in 
constitutions” and noting “the remarkable diffusion of social rights into constitutions around the 
world over the past fifty or sixty years”). See also discussion supra note 15 (examining the 
overlap in instrumental and normative goals).  
178 See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Smart Power: Feminism and Instrumentalism in US Foreign Policy 
(2013) (unpublished paper presented at the Public International Law Workshop, London School 
of Economics ) (on file with the author).  
179 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37, 37–38 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (“In the past few years, many have experimented with 
the metaphor of a constitution to describe the legal order beyond the nation-state . . . . Others 
have seen a constitutional moment in the emergence of human rights as a global vernacular for 
the legitimacy of power . . . . Comparative constitutional law is front and center in their accounts 
of how we are governed at the global level.”). Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and 
Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL 19–73 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 
36. 
180 See generally WEBB KEANE, SIGNS OF RECOGNITION: POWERS AND HAZARDS OF 
REPRESENTATION IN AN INDONESIAN SOCIETY 23–28 (1997) (by means of an ethnography of ritual 
speech in Anakalang, discussing the “social force of signs” and their potential for failure because 
symbols are at once both representations and material things). 
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When reviewing the judicial decisions it became evident that—unlike the 
instances of judges responding to sentencing circle requests with a list of 
factors to consider—judges did not develop common law directive tools to 
assist in processing sentencing circle recommendations. When a sentencing 
circle was requested, judges limited their discretion by creating tests and 
identifying criteria that had to be considered. By comparison, at the final 
stage of crafting the sentence, judges treated the sentencing circle 
recommendations inconsistently and without disciplined legal techniques.    
Several judges did not give an account of the sentencing circle 
recommendations for the record.181 Sometimes judges compared the 
recommendations to pre-sentence reports or victim impact statements, and at 
other times judges seemed to approach the recommendations as if they were 
a negotiated settlement. There were no tests, factors, or technical practices 
that judges implemented to decide whether or not to include sentencing circle 
recommendations into the final sentence. At this second stage—after the 
sentencing circle has been conducted—judges were left without legal 
techniques and technologies to assist in processing the information, in 
weighing and balancing considerations, or in dealing with legal conflicts. 
At first glance, this absence of legal devices may not seem problematic. 
One could argue that conducting a sentencing circle allows the judge to get 
more information about the accused and the community’s ability to help 
monitor conditions. Nevertheless, the final sentencing rests with the judge. 
While section 35(1) of the Constitution Act of 1982 recognizes Aboriginal 
rights and practices,182 these are not unlimited rights and must be 
compatible with Canadian sovereign authority.183 In other words, Canadian 
sovereign authority has a monopoly on sentencing and incarceration, such 
that the potential right to a pre-existing practice to conduct healing circles is 
not unfettered. 
This technical legal argument is not overly persuasive in light of a 
technical counterargument. If the sentencing circle is merely an information 
gathering exercise, there is no reason to require a test to decide whether a 
sentencing circle can be held. If there are criteria to determine whether to 
allow the request for a sentencing circle, the sentencing circle is ab initio—
distinct from other pre-sentencing practices without tests.  
181 See discussion supra note 81.  
182 The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
183 See Mitchell v. Minister of Nat’l Revenue, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (Can.) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that even if an Aboriginal community had a tradition of 
military force as part of its distinctive culture, there is no concurrent right to deploy an army and 
that only the Canadian sovereign authority may maintain a military and use force within its own 
territory). 
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Sentencing circle recommendations may appear functionally similar to 
pre-sentencing reports or victim impact statements. However, focusing on the 
instrumental form—“the particular devices, practices, or orientations”—
184makes the differences apparent. The practices required to compose pre-
sentencing reports, victim impact statements, and sentencing circle 
recommendations differ.185 A pre-sentence report is put together by a 
probation officer in the course of his or her employment, usually in the form 
of a document with questions.186 On the other hand, sentencing circle 
recommendations come about through unscripted, guided discussion by 
varied numbers of volunteers participating and observing. The process can be 
lengthy and intrusive to the lives of the victims, the accused, and the 
community. 
The level and extent of community participation in sentencing circles 
brings to mind jury or lay judge involvement in the legal system.187 Scholars 
have noted the similarities between jury participation and democracy.188 The 
link between political and judicial participation also figures prominently into 
184 Law as Object, supra note 13, at 201; see also Pottage, supra note 31 (exploring Roman Law as 
a way to examine law as a specific set of tools and technical devices for making relations); see 
also COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 43, at 232 (arguing that legal theorists, social 
scientists, and policy makers need to pay more attention to legal form and legal technique in 
addition to the content of law and legal regulation). 
185 See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC FACTS 45–69 (1986) (describing the practices of laboratory scientists which “inscribe” 
material substances into diagrammatic form, focusing on the particular and varied activities 
which produce journal articles). 
186 Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Paula Maurutto, Re-Contextualizing Pre-Sentence Reports: Risk and 
Race, 12 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 262, 263, 267 (2010) (noting the number of jurisdictions in 
Canada and the United States that are using “standardized actuarial risk assessment 
instruments,” reports that focus on “‘objective’ criteria (i.e. type of offence, prior criminal history, 
age and gender and sentence length) and factors that are empirically shown to be statistically co-
related with recidivism,” which can be quickly scored). 
187 See, e.g., Goldbach & Hans, supra note 26 (explaining that the provisions that make 
sentencing circles permissible for Aboriginal offenders address the circumstances of that 
population, and include the history of indigenous confrontation with colonizers and its current 
effects and manifestations. It is therefore difficult to conceive of a situation where a non-
aboriginal community would conduct a sentencing circle); see R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 
688, para. 58 (Can.); R. v. Poker (2006), 261 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1 (Can. Nfld. & Lab. T.D.) (showing 
that despite not taking sentencing circles out of the conversation about lay participation in 
criminal law, historically and presently, many jurisdictions have and do restrict the selection of 
juries or lay judges on the basis of socio-economic, occupational, educational or other 
demographic factors); see S. Kutnjak Ivkovi, Exploring Lay Participation in Legal Decision-
Making: Lessons from Mixed Tribunals, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 429 (2007) (examining lay judges 
and the mixed tribunal system in Croatia); UNDERSTANDING WORLD JURY SYSTEMS THROUGH 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (Martin F. Kaplan & Ana M. Martín eds., 2006) (exploring lay 
participation and mixed tribunals in Italy, Poland, Germany, and Japan). 
188 JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2010); Valerie Hans, Introduction: Citizens as 
Legal Decision Makers: An International Perspective, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 303 (2007). 
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the Canadian reforms.189 While the government eventually disaggregated the 
political goals from the goal to increase Aboriginal participation in justice 
design and delivery, the notion of “citizen-in-justice” has always been 
integrated into the Aboriginal Justice Strategy mandate.190 The Aboriginal 
Justice Initiative and its successor, the Aboriginal Justice Strategy, could not 
be legitimate if Aboriginal communities did not have the right to administer 
justice. At the very least, the federal government has indicated its intention 
to delegate authority to federally-funded Community Justice Committees in a 
way that should make outright dismissal of sentencing circle 
recommendations inappropriate.191  
Moreover, the 1996 amendments to the sentencing provisions in the 
Criminal Code were clearly meant to address a lack of expertise that 
sentencing scholars had previously identified. Judges were generalists 
without consistent application of the purposes of sentencing or principles 
governing legal sanctions.192 In sentencing circles, in particular, cultural and 
personal expertise shifts to the community. Unlike juries and lay judges, 
“lay” participants in sentencing circles occupy the role of experts through 
their knowledge of culturally appropriate procedures and often through a 
familiarity with the accused.193 As already noted, in many communities this 
expertise is constituted, institutionalized, and bureaucratized through 
government-funded Aboriginal Justice Committees. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Three developments reformed sentencing for Aboriginal offenders in the 
criminal trial, including the ad hoc way in which judges began conducting 
sentencing circles, the 1996 Criminal Code amendments that directed judges 
to consider the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders, and the establishment 
of the Aboriginal Justice Strategy. The examination of reported decisions 
reveals that transplanting Aboriginal sentencing circles into the criminal 
trial was neither an outright success nor failure. A “transplant effect”194 
occurred with judges seemingly unsure of how to integrate sentencing circle 
recommendations or what was being asked of them during the final 
189 LaPrairie, supra note 69; see also BRIDGING THE CULTURAL DIVIDE, supra note 16. Initially, 
the rationale for funding the Aboriginal Justice Initiative was to support participation in justice 
administration in order to prepare communities for treaty negotiations and some measure of 
political administration. Id. 
190ABORIGINAL JUSTICE STRATEGY EVALUATION 2011, supra note 83. 
191 See discussion supra note 81. 
192 CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 68. 
193 This also parallels historical accounts of juries in England who would testify to their personal 
knowledge of local disputes. 
194 Berkowitz et al., supra note 6, at 167. 
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sentencing stage. The data reveals a stark contrast between legal criteria 
developed at the request stage and the absence of technical legal knowledge 
practices at the recommendation and sentencing stage. 
The history of sentencing reform in Part II describes how law reform 
projects constituted cultured procedures, which then became instruments 
reformers could use. In comparing justice principles, Aboriginal justice 
advocates identified an expression of Aboriginal culture as the solution to 
both humanistic experiential and sociological goals. I call this an 
instrumentalizing of the expressive, where an attempt to generate meaning 
was not only the end-goal, but also the tool—the “thing in the world”—to 
accomplish other goals that law reformers defined.195 By way of conclusion, 
this Article suggests that, when transforming the expressive into a tool, a 
technical approach might be just the thing to reveal knowledge and enable 
normative goals.  
Rather than excoriate the judges who were involved in these decisions, I 
want to appeal to the technical knowledge practices that legal intermediaries 
already use to mediate risk.196 Unfortunately, in American legal thinking, the 
technical aspects of legal knowledge practices are conflated with legal 
formalism as to how law does its work, and as to the opposite of what law 
does. Those legal thinkers who reacted against formalism did so in part 
because of formalism’s capacity to obscure what was felt to be politically 
based decisions;197 for example, decisions favoring corporations over labor. On 
the other hand, with respect to sentencing circles, it is legal formality that 
established sentencing circles as a legal procedure. Through the application 
of tests and precedent, sentencing circles have become accessible within the 
criminal trial. It is where form is absent, at the stage of processing the 
sentencing circle’s recommendations, that knowledge and politics are 
obscured.  
In the case of sentencing circles, formalities may reveal reason. Instead of 
obscuring preferences, legal technicalities at the recommendation stage may 
force judges to be explicit about their preferences, such as between justice 
theories or between expert versus “lay” decision-making in sentencing 
offenders. Applying technical legal knowledge practices at this stage may also 
be the kind of formality that facilitates, rather than hinders, desired 
constitutive and corrective justice goals. In the very least, some kind of 
technical legal practice by judges at the recommendation stage would 
reinforce Aboriginal authority to administer justice, and confer respect on the 
community’s voice. The technical part of law, including reports, legislation, 
and logical legal reasoning delivered sentencing circles as a legal procedure 
195 Law as Object, supra note 13, at 9–11. 
196 VALVERDE, supra note 29, at 192.  
197 See generally SUMMERS, supra note 12. 
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in the criminal trial. Where technique was absent, knowledge became 
obstructed and social normative goals were put in jeopardy. Especially where 
an expression of culture is used as a tool, those engaged in law reform must 
challenge themselves to explore outcomes as evidence of unmet expectations.  
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Appendix A 
Request for Sentencing Circles by Case, Year, and Court 
 
 Hit # In 
Search 
Case Name Year Court Crown 
consent 
and/or 
request 
not 
reported 
Request 
inferred 
from 
appellate 
level 
decision 
Request 
Allowed 
1 1 R. v. Smarch 2010 YKTC x  Y 
2 2 R. v. Cooper 2010 Ont. CA x x Y 
3 4 R. v. Van Bibber 2010 YKTC x  Y 
4 6 R. v. Langan 2010 SK PC x  Y 
5 11 R. v. Favel 2009 SK QB   N 
6 14 R. v. Pauchay 2009 SK PC   Y 
7 17 R. v. Brooks 2008 NS PC x  Y 
8 19 R. v. Stimson 2008 AB PC x  Y 
9 24 R. v. 
MacKendrick 
2007 BC PC x  Y 
10 25 R. v. Elliot 2006 AB PC x  Y 
11 26 R. v. Braun 2006 BC PC x  Y 
12 27 R. v. Poker 2006 NL TD x  Y 
13 28 R. v. 
Kahypeasewat 
2006 SK PC x  Y 
14 30 R. v. James 2006 YKTC x  Y 
15 31 R. v. Kinistino 2006 SK PC   N 
16 32 R. v. Craft 2006 YKTC x  Y 
17 33 R. v. Desnomie 2005 SK CA x x Y 
18 34 R. v. Cappo 2005 SK CA x x Y 
19 36 R. v. Anaquod 2005 SK CA x x Y 
20 37 R. v. Gopher 2005 SK QB   N 
21 39 R. v. J. (J.) 2004 NL CA x x Y 
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22 41 R. v. Frank 2004 SK CA x  N 
23 44 R. v. Mackinaw 2004 BC PC x  N 
24 46 R. v. Morris∗ 2004 BC PC x  Y 
25 47 R. v. Joyea 2004 SK CA x x Y 
26 54 R. v. L. (B.) 2002 AB CA x x Y 
27 55 R. v. Munson 2001 SK QB   N 
28 56 R. v. Haines 2001 BCCA x x N 
29 58 R. v. K (N.T.) 2001 SK CA x x Y 
30 59 R. v. Stick (C.)*∗ 2001 SK QB   N 
31 72 R. v. Paul (D.) 1998 NB PC x  Y 
32 79 R. v. C. (H.K.) 1997 SK CA   Y 
33 81 R. v. R. (H.) 1997 AB PC x  Y 
34 83 R. v. Pena (M.J.) 1997 BC SC   N 
35 84 R. v. McKay 
(R.W.) 
1997 AB PC x  Y 
36 86 R. v. McDonald 
(D.P.) 
1997 SK CA x x Y 
37 87 R. v. 
Manyfingers 
(C.J.) 
1996 AB PC x  Y 
38 89 R. v. Nicholas 
(B.L.) 
1996 NB PC   Y 
39 90 R. v. Severight 
(A.D.) 
1996 SK CA x x Y 
40 93 R. v. Johns (J.C.) 1995 YK CA x x Y 
41 95 R. v. Taylor 
(W.B.) 
1995 SK QB x  Y 
42 96 R. v. John (R.C.) 1995 AB CA x x Y 
43 98 R. v. Rope 1994 SK QB   Y 
∗ R. v. Morris: the decision refers to a "talking circle" and the judge and Crown were not present; 
however the judge treated the procedure like a sentencing circle and accepted the 
recommendations. 
∗∗  R. v. Stick: the reported case is an order to set aside decision denying application for holding a 
sentencing circle, reviewing judge remanded case back to trial judge to hear submissions about 
whether or not to hold a sentencing circle. 
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44 99 R. v. Johnson 
(G.) 
1994 YK CA x x Y 
45 101 R. v. R. (S.)  1994 NF SC   N 
46 102 R. v. Morin (I.) 1993 SK QB x  Y 
47 103 R. v. Cheekinew 1993 SK QB   N 
48  R. v. Moses 1992 YK TC x  Y 
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Appendix B 
Whether the Judge Followed the Sentencing Circle’s 
Recommendations: Cases Where Sentencing Circles were 
Held, by Case, Year, and Court 
 
 Hit # In 
Search 
Case Name Year Court Recommendation 
Followed 
1 1 R. v. Smarch 2010 YKTC U∗ 
2 2 R. v. Cooper 2010 Ont. CA N 
3 4 R. v. Van Bibber 2010 YKTC Y 
4 6 R. v. Langan 2010 SK PC N 
5 12 R. v. Pauchay (II) 2009 SK PC N 
6 17 R. v. Brooks 2008 NS PC Y 
7 19 R. v. Stimson 2008 AB PC U 
8 24 R. v. MacKendrick 2007 BC PC U 
9 25 R. v. Elliot 2006 AB PC N 
10 27 R. v. Poker 2006 NL TD N 
11 28 R. v. Kahypeasewat 2006 SK PC U 
12 30 R. v. James 2006 YKTC U 
13 32 R. v. Craft 2006 YKTC Y 
14 33 R. v. Desnomie 2005 SK CA U 
15 34 R. v. Cappo 2005 SK CA Y 
16 36 R. v. Anaquod 2005 SK CA U 
17 39 R. v. J. (J.) 2004 NL CA Y 
18 46 R. v. Morris∗* 2004 BC PC Y 
∗ U—Unknown: No description of recommendations; there was no information in case about 
what, if any, recommendations were presented following the sentencing circle. 
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19 47 R. v. Joyea 2004 SK CA U 
20 54 R. v. L. (B.) 2002 AB CA Y 
21 58 R. v. K (N.T.) 2001 SK CA Y 
22 72 R. v. Paul (D.) 1998 NB PC Y 
23 75 R. v. Taylor 1997 SK CA N 
24 79 R. v. C. (H.K.) 1997 SK CA U∗** 
25 81 R. v. R. (H.)∗*∗* 1997 AB PC N 
26 84 R. v. McKay (R.W.) 1997 AB PC Y 
27 86 R. v. McDonald (D.P.) 1997 SK CA U 
28 87 R. v. Manyfingers (C.J.) 1996 AB PC Y 
29 89 R. v. Nicholas (B.L.) 1996 NB PC Y 
30 90 R. v. Severight (A.D.) 1996 SK CA U 
31 93 R. v. Johns (J.C.) 1995 YK CA U 
32 95 R. v. Taylor (W.B.) 1995 SK QB Y 
33 96 R. v. John (R.C.) 1995 AB CA Y 
34 98 R. v. Rope 1994 SK QB Y 
35 99 R. v. Johnson (G.) 1994 YK CA Y 
36 102 R. v. Morin (I.) 1993 SK QB Y 
37  R. v. Moses 1992 YK TC Y  
 
∗∗ The judge left during the process. 
∗∗∗ The judge left during the process. 
∗∗∗∗ The Circle was conducted by Edmonton Native Youth Justice Committee (“ENYJC”), a group 
recognized by the Department of Justice. ENYCJ normally holds circles to assist in 
recommendations to the Edmonton Youth Court. However, in this case the defendant was 
charged as an adult because he was twenty-one years old at the time of the offence. 
  
                                                                                                                                          
